THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY
Vol. V. CONTEST OF EMPIRE AND PAPACY - THE CRUSADES
1. (a) The Italian Cities; (b) The Norman conquest of Italy and Sicily.
2. Corruption of the Church: Cluniac movement. 3. Gregory VII and the
Investiture Contest. 4. Civil and Canon Law. 5. Germany under Henry IV
and Henry V. 6. (a) Islam and Egypt, (750-1097) ; (b) The First Crusade.
7. The Kingdom of Jerusalem. 8. The Monastic Orders. 9. Germany,
(1125-1152). 10. Italy, (1125-1152). 11. Frederick Barbarossa and
Germany. 12. (a) Frederick Barbarossa and the Lombard League; (b) South
Italy in the twelfth century. 13. England: Norman kings (William II to
Stephen). 14. England: Henry VI. 15. France and the Angevin dominion.
16. France and the Communal movement. 17. England. 18. Scholasticism.
19. Effects of the Crusades on Western Europe.
CAMBR. MED. HIST. VOL. V - CHAPTER II.
GREGORY VII AND THE FIRST CONTEST BETWEEN EMPIRE AND PAPACY.
On 21 April 1073 Pope Alexander II died. The strained relations
between the Papacy and the rider of the Empire made the occasion more
than usually critical; moreover, the Election Decree of Nicholas II, for
which so narrow a victory had been won at the previous vacancy, was to
be
put to a second test. Fortunately for the Papacy, there was no division
of
opinion within the Curia ; the outstanding personality of the Archdeacon
Hildebrand made it certain on whom the choice of the cardinals would
fall. But their deliberations were anticipated by the impatience of the
populace. While the body of Alexander was being laid to rest in the
church of St John Lateran on the day following his death, a violent
tumult arose. The crowd seized upon the person of Hildebrand, hurried
him to the church of St Peter ad Vincula, and enthusiastically acclaimed
him as Pope. The formalities of the Election Decree were hastily
complied with ; the cardinals elected, the clergy and people gave their
assent,
and Hildebrand was solemnly enthroned as Pope Gregory VII*. Popular
violence had compromised the election, and provided a handle for the
accusations of his enemies. But the main purpose of the Election Decree
had been fulfilled. The Pope was the nominee neither of the Emperor
nor of the Roman nobles; the choice of the cardinals had been
anticipated
indeed, but not controlled, by the enthusiasm of the multitude.
Hildebrand
only held deacon's orders; a month later he was ordained priest, and on
30 June- consecrated bishop. In the interval, he seems, in accordance
with the Election Decree, to have announced his election to the king and
to have obtained the royal assent.
We have little certain information' of the origin and early hfe of this
great Pope. He is said to have been the son of one Bonizo and to have
been bom at Sovana in Tuscany; the date of his birth is uucertain, but he
was probably about fifty years old at the time of his accession. The im-
portant fact, to which he himself bears emphatic testimony, is that his
early days were passed in Rome and that it was there that he received his
^ The choice of name is siguificant. It seems most probable that he took it in
memory of his predecessor and master, Gregory VI.
^ Or 29 June. But as 30 June was a Sunday, the regular day for episcopal
consecration5, it is the more likely date, although 29 June was a great
festival.
2 But see R. L. Poole, Benedict IX and Gregory VI (from Ptoc. Brit. Acad. Vol. vin).
CH. II. 4 — 2
52 Early life of Pope Gregory VII
education. So he saw the Papacy in its degradation and was to
participate in every stage of its recovery. He received minor orders
(reluctantly,
he tells us) and was attached in some capacity to the service of Gregory
VI,
the Pope who bought the Papacy in order to reform it. With him he
went into exile in 1047, and spent two impressionable years in the Rhine
district, then the centre of the advanced reform movement of the day,
and
probably it was at this time that he received the monastic habits
In
1049 Leo IX, nominated Pope by Henry III, was filling the chief places
in the Papal Curia with leading reformers especially from this district; on
his way to Rome he took with him the young Hildebrand, whose life was
for the future to be devoted entirely to Rome and the Papacy. With
every detail of papal activity he was associated, in every leading incident
he played his part; his share in the Papal councils became increasingly
important, until at the last he was the outstanding figure whose qualifica-
tions for the Papal throne none could contest.
By Leo IX he was made sub-deacon and entrusted with the task of
restoring both the buildings and the discipline of the monastery of St
Paul without the walls. Later he was sent to France to deal with heresy
in the person of Berengar of Tours, whose views he condemned but whose
person he protected. By Victor II he was given the important task of
enforcing the decrees against simony and clerical marriage in France,
where in company with Abbot Hugh of Cluny he held synods at Lyons
and elsewhere. With Bishop Anselm of Lucca he was sent by Pope
Stephen IX to Milan, where the alliance of Pope and Pataria was for the
first time cemented; and from Milan to Germany to obtain the royal
assent to Stephen's election. He had a share in vindicating the
independence of Papal elections against the turbulence of the Roman
nobles at
the election of Nicholas II, and again in the Papal Election Decree
which
was designed to establish this independence for the future. By Nicholas
he
was employed in initiating the negotiations which led to the first
alliance
of the Papacy with the Normans in South Italy. In the same year (1059)
his appointment as Archdeacon of the Roman Church gave him an
important administrative position ; shortly afterwards occurred the
death
of Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, and Hildebrand took his place as
the leading figure in the Papal Curia. To his energy and resolution was
due the victory of Alexander II over the rival imperial nominee, and he
held the first place in the Pope's councils during the twelve years of
Alexander's Papacy. The extent of his influence has been exaggerated by
the flattery of his admirers and by the abuse of his enemies. He was the
right-hand man, not the master, of the Pope; he influenced, but did not
^ His statement to Archbishop Anno of Cologne (Reg. I, 79) — ob
recordationem
disciplinae, qua tempore antecessoris vestri in ecclesia Coloniensi
enutriti sumus —
seems to bear this interpretation, and can only be referred to this
period. In view of
the testimony of friends and enemies alike, I find it impossible to
accept the contention of Dr W. Martens that Hildebrand never became a
monk.
His position under Alexander II 53
dominate Alexander. That other counsels often prevailed we know.
When he became Pope he revoked more than one privilege granted by his
predecessor, suggesting that Alexander was too prone to be led away by
evil counsellors. Even when, a.s in the case of the papal support given
to
the Norman conquest of England, his policy prevailed, it is clear from
his
own statement that he had to contend against considerable opposition
within the Curia. On all the major issues, however, Pope and archdeacon
must have been in complete agreement, especially with regard to Milan,
the greatest question of all. They had been associated together in the
embassy that inaugurated the new Papal policy with regard to the
Pataria, and, as Bishop of Lucca, Alexander had been more than once
employed as Papal legate to Milan. This was the critical issue that led
to
the breach between Pope and king, and it was the extension of the same
policy to Germany that produced the ill-will of the German episcopate
which is so noticeable at the beginning of Gregory's papacy. That there
is a change of masters wlien Gregory VII becomes Pope is clear. The
policy is the same, but the method of its execution is quite different.
Hildebrand must have chafed at the slowness and caution of his
predecessor. When he becomes Pope, he is urgent to see the policy canned
into immediate effect. The hand on the reins is now a firm one, the
controlling mind is ardent and impatient. Soon the issue is joined, and
events
move rapidly to the catastrophe.
Superficially the new Pope was not attractive. He was small of
stature, his voice was weak, his appearance unprepossessing. In learning
he fell short of many of his contemporaries; the knowledge of which he
gives evidence is limited, though very practical for his purpose. Thus
he
had a close acquaintance with the collections of Decretals current in
his
time. Besides them he depended mainly on Gregory the Great, with
several of whose works he was obviously familiar. Otherwise there is
practically no indication of any first-hand acquaintance with the works
of
the Fathers or other Church writers. He adduces the authority of a few
passages from Ambrose and John Chrysostom in urging on Countess
Matilda of Tuscany the impoi*tance of frequent communion. Once only
does he quote from Augustine-, and then the reference is to the De
doctrina Christiana; the Civitas Dei^ quoted so frequently by his
supporters and opponents alike, is not mentioned by him at all.
The chief authority with him was naturally the Bible. The words of
Scripture, both Old and New Testament, were constantly on his lips.
1 That many of these Decretals were forged is well known, but of course to
Gregory, as to all his contemporaries, they were not known to be other than genuine.
- It has been shewn by Mirbt, Bernheim, and others that he follows closely the
views of Augustine, especially as expressed in the Civitas Dei; but when he quotes
his authority for these views it is the authority of Gregory the Great that he ad-
duces. It seems to me therefore that it is from Gregory that he absorbs Augustine,
not from a selection of Augustine as Mirbt thinks.
54 His temperament and character
But, though quotations from the New Testament are the more numerous,
it is the spirit of the Old Testament that prevails. His doctrine is of
righteousness as shewn in duty and obedience, rather than as expressed in
the gospel of love. The language of the Old Testament came most
naturally to him; he was fond of military metaphors, and his language
is that of a general engaged in a constant campaign against a vigilant
enemy. A favourite quotation was from Jeremiah, "Cursed be the man
that keepeth back his sword from blood," though he usually added with
Gregory the Great "that is to say, the word of preaching from the rebuk-
ing of carnal men." He was, in fact, in temperament not unlike a prophet
of the Old Testament — fierce in denunciation of wrong, confident in
prophecy, vigorous in action, unshaken in adversity. It is not surprising
to find that contemporaries compared him with the prophet Elijah.
His
enthusiasm and his ardent imagination drew men to him ; that he
attracted
men is well attested. One feature his contemporaries remarked — the
brightness and keenness of his glance. This was the outward sign of the
fiery spirit within that insignificant frame, which by the tiame of its
enthusiasm could provoke the unwilling to acquiescence and stimulate
even the fickle Roman population to devotion. It was kindled by his
conviction of the righteousness of his aims and his determination, in
which self-interest did not participate, to carry them into effect.
This had its weak side. He was always too ready to judge of men by
their outward acquiescence in his aims, without regarding their motives.
It is remarkable that with his experience he could have been deceived by
the professions of Cardinal Hugo Candidus, or have failed to realise the
insincerity of Henry IVs repentance in 1073. Here he was deceived to
his own prejudice. It is not easy, however, to condone his readiness in
1080 to accept the alliance of Robert Guiscard, who had been under
excommunication until that date, or of the Saxons, whom he had spoken
of as rebels in 1075, and who were actuated by no worthier motives in
1076 and 1080. In the heat of action he grievously compromised his
ideal.
Another and a more inevitable result of his temperament was the
frequent reaction into depression. Like Elijah, again, on Mount Carmel
we find him crying out that there is not a righteous man left. Probably
these moods were not infrequent, though they could only find expression
in his letters to intimate friends such as Countess Matilda of Tuscany
and
Abbot Hugh of Cluny. And the gentler tone of these letters shews him
in a softer light — oppressed by his burden, dependent solely on the
helping hand of the "pauper Jesus." It was a genuine reluctance of which
he
spoke when he emphasised his unwillingness at every stage of his life to
have fresh burdens, even of honour, imposed upon him. There is no
reeison to doubt that he was unwilling to become Pope; the event itself
prostrated him, and his first letters, announcing his election and
appealing for support, had to be dictated from his bed.
This was a temporary weakness, soon overcome. And it would be a
The Petrine authority 55
mistake to regard him merely, or even mainly, as an enthusiast and a
visionary. He had a strong will and could curb his imagination with an
iron self-control. As a result he has been pictured most strangely as cold
and inflexible, untouched by human weakness, unmoved by human sym-
pathies. It is not in that light that we should view him at the Lenten
Synod of 1076, where he alone remained calm and his will availed to
quell the uproar ; it was self-control that checked his impatience in the
period following Canossa, and that was responsible for his firmness and
serenity amid defeat and disappointment, so that he remained unconquered
in spirit almost to the end. But there was another influence too, the
experience of the vears that preceded his papacy.
As cardinal-deacon for
over twenty years, and Archdeacon of the Roman Church for thirteen,
his work had lain particularly among the secular affairs of the Papacy;
from this he had acquired great practical knowledge and a keen sense of
the actual. It coloured his whole outlook, and produced the contrast
between the theories he expressed and the limitation of them that he was
willing to accept. He had a clear vision both of what was essential and
of what was possible ; it was later clouded by the dust of conflict, after
he had joined issue with the Emperor.
His early life had been spent in the service of the Church and the
Papacy. This service remained his single aim, and he was actuated, as he
justly claimed, by no feeling of worldly pride or self-glorification. He
naturally had a full sense of the importance of his office, and realised
both its potentialities and its responsibilities. To St Peter, who had
watched over the training of his vouth, he owed his earliest allegiance;
as Bishop of Rome he had become the successor and representative of
St Peter, It was not the least of his achievements that he realised the
logical inferences that could be drawn from the Petrine authority ; he was
careful to sink his own individuality, and to picture himself as the channel
through which the will of the Apostle was expressed to mankind. Every
communication addressed to the Pope by letter or by word of mouth is
received by St Peter himself; and, while the Pope only reads the words
or listens to the message, St Peter can read the heart of the sender. Any y^
injury done, even in thought, to the Pope is thus an injury to the Prince
of the Apostles himself. He acts as the mouthpiece of St Peter, his sen«T
tences are the sentences of St Peter, and from St Peter has descended to
him the supreme power of binding and of loosing in heaven and on earths
So his power of excommunication is unlimited: he can excommunicate,
as in the case of six bishops with all their supporters at the Lenten
Synod of 1079, sine spe recuperat'ioms. Similarly his power of absolution
is unlimited, whether it be absolution to the penitent, absolution from
all their sins to those who fight the battles of the Church against her
enemies, or absolution of the subjects of an excommunicated ruler from
the oath of allegiance they had taken to him. These are not the asser-
tions of a claim; they are the simple expression of his absolute belief.
66 His use of this authority
How supreme was his confidence is shewn in his prophecies. The authority
descended from St Peter extends over material prosperity in this life ; yes,
and over life itself. Glory and honour in this life, as well as in the life to
come, depend on obedience to him, he assured the magistrates of Sardinia
in 1073.
In 1078 he proclaimed that all who hindered the holding of a
synod in Germany would suffer not only in soul but also in body and
property, would win no success in war and no triumph in their lifetime.
And at Easter 1080 he pronounced his famous prophecy that Henry, if he
did not repent, would be dead or deposed before August. This is the
confidence of complete conviction.
But it was a delegated authority that he was exercising, and therefore
it must not be exercised arbitrarily. The obedience to God which he
enforced on all Christians must be rendered by himself first of all.
Obedience
to God implies obedience to the Church and to the law of the Church, to
the decrees of the Fathers, the canonical tradition. He shews no dis-
position to over-ride this; in fact he is careful to explain that he is
subject to its authority. Frequently he protested that there was nothing
new in his decrees. His decree against lay investiture was not new, not
of his own invention; in promulgating it he had merely returned to the
teaching and decrees of the Early Fathers and followed the prime unique
rule of ecclesiastical discipline. He did not make new laws; he issued
edicts which interpreted the law or prohibited the illegal practices
that
had grown up in course of time. The Holy Roman Church, he says, has
always had and will always have the right of issuing new decrees to deal
with particular abuses as they arise. Its custom has always been to be
merciful, to temper the rigour of the law with discretion, to tolerate
some
things after careful consideration, but never to do anything which
conflicts with the harmony of canonical tradition.
Now the prime importance of this consideration of Gregory VII's
views is in its bearing on his relations with the temporal authority. He
started with the orthodox Gelasian view of the two powers each supreme
in its own department, and it is clear that at first he sees no conflict of
his ideas with this. In the ecclesiastical department of course he must be
absolute master. Archbishops, bishops, and abbots must acknowledge his
complete authority, obey his summons to Rome, submit to his over-riding
of their actions, and not interfere with direct appeals to Rome. The
legates he sends act in his name. Anywhere they can call synods, preside
over them, and issue decrees on his behalf. But, as his own office is
divinely ordained, so he recognises is the royal office.
In 1073 he speaks
of the two powers and compares them with the two eyes of the human
body; as these give light to the body, so the sacerdotium and imperium
should illumine with spiritual light the body of the Church. They should
work together in the harmony of pure religion for the spiritual good of
Christianity ; the spiritual end is the final object of both, in accordance
with the accepted medieval view. Obedience, therefore, is due to kings;
Sacerdotium and imperium. Iustitia 57
he shews no indulgence with the Saxon revolt in 1073, and congratulates
Henry on his victory over the rebels in 1075. Over churches he
continually
repeats that the lav power has a protective not a possessive function,
but
he is anxious not to appear to be encroaching on imperial prerogative.
Though he is convinced that the practice of lay investiture is an abuse
that has arisen in the course of time, he recognises that it has come to
be regarded almost as a prescriptive right ^; he is careful not to
promulgate his decree against it in 1075 until he has consulted the
king,
upon whose rights, he declares, he is anxious not to encroach. The
language of these early days is markedly different from that of his
later
years.
The normal contrast between medieval theory and practice is noticeable
at the beginning, when he is content to subordinate his theory to
practical considerations; in later years he is striving to bring his
practice
up to the level of his theorY. The difference lies not so much in a
change
in his point of view-, as in a recognition of its real implications and
of its
actual incompatibility with the orthodox Gelasian theory. This
recognition was forced upon him by the circumstances of the stniggle
with the
king, without which he might never have adopted the extreme attitude
of his later years. His methods help to mark the difference. At first he
attempts to promote his aims by mutual agreement and negotiation;!
afterwards he acts by decree, issuing his orders and demanding implicit
obedience.
The key to his development is to be found in his insistence on right-
eousness* as the criterion by which he tests his own actions and those of
all with whom he has to deal. Righteousness, with him as with Augustine,
consists in obedience to the commandments of God. Truth, obedience,
humility, are the marks of the righteous man, the servant of God, as
falsehood, disobedience, pride, are the marks of the wicked man, whose
master is the devil. If this is merely medieval commonplace, it becomes
something more in its application. It is when he has to deal with an
unrighteous king that he discovers the logical results of his opinions.
The Pope, as St Peter's successor, has authority over the souls of men;
he has in consequence an awful responsibilitv as he will have to answer
for them before the tribunal of God. It is incumbent upon him to rebuke
those that err; it is he, in fact, that must be the judge of right and wrong,
and to this judgment all men, even kings, must be subject. Every act of
a king must have the test of right and wrong applied to it, for it is a
* In a letter to Bishop Anselm of Lucca in 1073 he indirectly recognises the royal right of investiture.
2 The recent work of Father Peitzand others has demonstrated that the Regutrum
Gregorii VII is the actual Register of the Pope's letters kept by the Papal Chancery
(which must have done its work rather casually). This establishes the authenticity
of the Dwtatus Papae of 1075, with its extreme claims, as a genuine expression of
Papal theory at that time.
3 I prefer to translate "iustitia" by "righteousness" rather than "justice," as I
think it conveys a more accurate rendering of Gregory VII's meaning.
58 The supremacy of the spiritual power
king's duty to govern for the spiritual welfare of his subjects.
Obedience
to God is the sign of the iustis homo how much more of the iustus rex
And so, if a king does not act as a iustus homo he at once becomes
amenable to Papal jurisdiction. The head of the spiritual department is
entitled accordingly to obedience from secular rulers.
"As I have to
answer for you at the awful Judgment," he writes to William I of
England^, "in the interests of your own salvation, ought you, can you
avoid
immediate obedience to me ?" The implication is that the obedience which
is expected from all Christians is obedience to himself.
When the great question came as to the sentence of a king who was,
in his view, manifestly unrighteous, there could be no doubt with him as
to the authority he could exercise. The theory of passive obedience to a
wicked king could not influence him or his supporters for a moment; a
king who aimed at his own glory had ceased to be the servant of God
and become the servant of the devil; he was no longer a king but a
tyrant.
With the Pope, the judge of right and wrong, lay the sentence. Saul,
ordained by God for his humility, was deposed by Samuel, the
representative of God, for his pride and disobedience.
The Pope is through St Peter
the representative of God; as he has power to bind and loose in
spiritual
things, how much more in secular! Henry had not merely been disobedient;
his pride had led him to attempt the overthrow of the Pope, a
direct outrage on St Peter himself. St Peter, therefore, through the
Pope's
mouth, pronounces sentence of excommunication and deposition. Gregory
has faced the logical outcome of his point of view. The two powers are
not equal and independent; the head of the ecclesiastical department is
dominant over the head of the temporal. And so, when the enemies of
Henry in Germany were contemplating the election of an anti-king to
succeed Rudolf, he sends them the wording of the oath that their new
choice must take to him — the oath of fealty of a vassal to his
overlord.
Gregory found himself faced at his accession with a situation that
gave him every cause for anxiety, but much real ground for optimism.
In the twenty-four years following his recall to Rome by Pope Leo IX a
great advance had been made. The reformed Papacy had assumed its
natural position as leader and director of the I'eform movement. It had
vindicated the independence of its own elections against the usurpation
of the Roman nobles and the practice of imperial nomination, it was
asserting its absolute authority in ecclesiastical matters over all archbishops
and bishops, and it was beginning to recover its temporal power in Italy.
But its progress was hampered by difficulties and opposition from every
^ Reg. VII, 25. This is the letter in which he expresses the relations between
the two powers by the simile of the sun and moon. As in 1073 they both give light,
but no longer equal light.
The situation in 1073 59
quarter. Papal decrees had been promulgated against simony and clerical
marriage, but there was more opposition to these decrees than obedience.
The absolute authority of the Pope over all metropolitans was not denied
in theory, but it had not been maintained in practice, and much resent-
ment was aroused by its exercise. The temporal possessions of the Pope
were continually exposed to the encroachments of the Normans, who would
acknowledge themselves vassals of the Papacy but paid no heed to its
instructions. And all these difficulties were complicated and controlled
by the relations of the Pope with the King of Germany, and by the clash of
their conflicting interests. The situation would have been easier had
Henry III been on the throne. He at any rate was an earnest promoter
of ecclesiastical reform. Henry IV was not even in sympathy with the
reform movement, and simony in episcopal elections had become frequent
once more; while he was as firmly resolved as his father that royal control '
over all his subjects, lay and ecclesiastical, should be maintained, and this
implied royal control of nominations to bishoprics and abbeys both in
Germany and North Italy. Hence the crisis that had arisen with regard
to Milan just before Alexander II's death.
P>
In the establishment of his
authority in the ecclesiastical department, Gregory was thus faced by
the
opposition of the higher clergy (except in Saxony where the bishops as
a whole allied themselves with the local opposition to Henry), supported
by the king, and also of the lower ranks of the secular clergy, who
considered that clerical celibacy was an ideal of perfection to which
they
ought not to be expected to aspire. He was supported on the whole by
the regulars and often by the mass of the common people, who were
readily aroused to action, as at Milan, against the laxity of the
secular
clergy.
It was evident to the Pope that his best chance of success lay in
obtaining the king's support. Without it he could not coerce the higher
clergy; with it the decrees for Church reform could be made efficacious.
He regarded the royal power as the natural supporter of the Papacy, and
the protector of its temporal authority in South Italy against Norman
aggression. His imagination led him to visualise the magnificent
conception of a united Empire and Papacy working together in harmony for
the
same spiritual objects, and he was sanguine enough to believe that Henry
could be induced to take the same view. And so the first task he under-
took was to bring about a reconciliation with the king. To effect this
he sought assistance from every quarter — the Empress-mother Agnes,
Beatrice and Matilda of Tuscany, Dukes Rudolf of Swabia and Godfrey
of Lower Lorraine, Bishop Rainald of Como — from anyone in short who
might exercise influence over the king, and who might be expected to
influence him in the right direction. Henry yielded, but he yielded to
necessity, not to persuasion.
In August he had with difficulty evaded the/
Saxons by flight and had made his way south, where he was remaining
isolated and almost without support. The situation was in many respects
60 Reconciliation with Henry IV
similar to that at Canossa, and the king's policy was the same on both
occasions — as his enemies in Germany had the upper hand, he must
propitiate the anger of the Pope, and this could only be done by a
complete outward submission. The letter Gregory VII received from the
king
in September 1073 was as abject as the humiliation of 1077, without the
personal degradation of Canossa. The king confesses that he is guilty of
all the charges brought against him and asks for papal absolution; he
promises obedience to Gregory's bidding in the matter of reform,
especially
in regard to Milan, and expresses his keen desire for the harmonious
co-operation of the spiritual and temporal powers. The delight of
Gregory
was unbounded when he received this letter, so full, he says, of
sweetness
and obedience, such as no Pope had ever received from Emperor before.
He failed to realise, though he saw it clearly enough later, that the
Saxon
situation was entirely responsible, and that Henry's humility depended
on his position in Germany ; he even did his best to bring Henry and the
Saxons to terms.
To Henry's appeal for absolution he responded with
enthusiasm, and early in the following year it was effected by an embassy
headed by two cardinal-bishops and accompanied by Henry's mother
Agnes.
Assured of royal support, or at any rate relieved from the embarrassment
of royal opposition, he now took in hand the important questions
of Church reform and the assertion of his ecclesiastical authority. He
knew the hostility he had to face. In North Italy, Archbishop Guibert
of Ravenna had submitted himself to Alexander II and promised obedience,
but little reliance could be placed on his promises; in general, the
morals
of the clergy were lax, the episcopate was mutinous. In Germany, there
was an atmosphere of sullen resentment against the measures already
taken
by Alexander, and of ill-will towards his successor.
It was not until 1074
that the two leading metropolitans — Siegfried of Mayence, the German
Arch-Chancellor, and Anno of Cologne (ex-regent of Germany, now living
in retirement and devoted to good works) — wrote to congratulate Gregory
on his election; and there is no evidence to shew that any of the others
were more forward in this respect. Siegfried took the opportunity of
expressing his pleasure and congratulations in a letter which he wrote on
the subject of the dispute between the Bishops of Prague and Olmlitz,
Bohemian sees within his province. In this letter he complained of the
intervention of the late Pope in a matter which came within his own
jurisdiction; particularly that Alexander had allowed the Bishop of
Olmiitz to appeal direct to Rome, and had sent legates to Bohemia who
without reference to Siegfried had suspended the Bishop of Prague from
his office. This was a test case, and Gregory replied with great vigour.
He rebutted the arguments from Canon Law which Siegfried had urged,
and accused him of neglect of his office and of arrogance towards the
Apostolic
See. Siegfried's timid attempt to assert himself was overwhelmed
by the Pope's vehemence, and he made no further effort to interfere with
Contest with the German episcopate 61
the Papal settlement of the question. The Bishop of Prague obeyed the
Pope's summons to Rome, and Gregory, by his lenient treatment of him,
gave the episcopate a lesson in the value of ready obedience.
This was a signal victory. He passed on to deal with the questions
of simony and clerical marriage. In the first synod he held in Rome, in
Lent 1074, he repeated the decrees of his predecessors against these
abuses,
and proceeded to take measures for their enforcement in Germany. The
two cardinal-bishops, who had given absolution to the king and to his
excommunicated councillors at Easter 1074, had the further task imposed
upon them of summoning a synod of German clergy, promulgating the
decrees at this synod, and enforcing acquiescence in their execution.
This
was a difficult task, rendered impossible by the overbearing manner of
the
Papal legates. They addressed themselves first to two of the leading
arch-bishops, Siegfried of Mayence and Liemar of Bremen, with a haughty
injunction to them to hold a synod. They met their match in Liemar.
A supporter of the reform movement, the methods of the Pope and his
legates roused his pride and independence. He refused to do anything
without previous consultation with the episcopate as a whole, and
sneered
at the impracticable suggestion that he should hold a synod to which his
suffragans far distant in North Germany or in Denmark would not be
able to come. Siegfried deprecated the whole business, but from timidity
rather than pride.
He temporised for six months and at last called a
synod at Erfurt in October. As he expected, he was faced by a violent
outburst from the secular clergy, who fortified themselves against the
decree enforcing celibacy by the words of St Paul, and the synod broke
up
in confusion. Another incident that happened at the same time well
illustrates the temper of the episcopate. Archbishop L^do of Treves was
ordered by the Pope to investigate the charges brought against the
Bishop
of I'oul by one of his clergy. He held a synod at which more than twenty
bishops were present. They commenced by a unanimous protest against
the Pope's action in submitting a bishop to the indignity of having to
answer before a synod to charges that any of his clergy might please to
bring against him. Needless to say, the bishop was unanimously
acquitted.
In only one quarter, in fact, could the Pope find support — in Saxony.
Here the episcopate was allied with the lay nobility in opposition to
Henry, and it was part of its policy to keep on good terms with the
Pope.
It is not surprising, then, to learn that Bishop Burchard of
Halberstadt, one of the chief leaders of the Saxons, wrote to Gregory to
deplore the
unworthy treatment of the papal legates in Germany, and received his
reward in a warm letter of commendation from the Pope.
Gregory now began to take vigorous action to enforce his will.
Arch-bishop Liemar, defiant to the legates who had summoned him to
appear
in Rome in November, was ordered by the Pope himself to come to the
^ Liemar gives a lively account of his altercation with the legates in a letter to the
Bishop of Hildesheim (Sudendorf, Reg. i, 5).
62 The Pope's efforts to enforce obedience in Germany
Lenten Synod of 1075. The same summons was sent to Archbishop
Siegfried, and to six of his suffragan bishops as well.
The Pope further
issued circulars appealing especially to prominent laymen to assist him in
executing his decrees. Siegfried's answer to Gregory's summons was typical
of the timid man striving to extricate himself from the contest between
two violently hostile parties. Afraid to oppose the Pope's will, and equally
afraid to enforce it, he excused himself from coming to Rome on the
ground of ill-health, pleaded lack of time for his inability to examine the
conduct of the six suffragans mentioned in Gregory's letter, but declared
that he had sent on the Pope's order with instructions to them to obey
it. He expressed his compliance with the decrees against simony and
clerical marriage, but urged moderation and discretion in their execution.
The synod sat at Rome from 24 to 28 February 1075. At this synod
the Pope suspended the absent and disobedient Liemar, and passed the
same sentence on the Bishops of Bamberg, Strasbourg, and Spires, three
of the six suffragans of Mayence whose attendance he had ordered; the
other three seem to have satisfied him, temporarily at any rate, by their
appearance or through representatives. Decrees were also passed against
simony and clerical marriage, with the special addition, in conformity with
Gregory's policy, of a clause calling on the laity to assist by refraining
from attending the mass celebrated by an offending priest. In sending
the text of these decrees to Archbishop Siegfried ^ he shewed that the
moderation urged by Siegfried was not in his mind at all. The decrees
are to be issued and enforced in their full rigour. Instructions to the same
effect were sent to other metropolitans and bishops, for instance to the
Archbishops of Cologne and Magdeburg, with injunctions to hold synods
to enforce the decrees. This was again pressed on Siegfried and distressed
him still further. He eventually replied to the Pope in July or August,
in a letter intended to be tactful and to shift responsibility from his
own shoulders. It was no use; Gregory was quite firm. He replied on
3 September, acknowledging the weight of Siegfried's arguments but
declaring them of no effect when set in the balance against his pastoral
duty. Siegfried was forced to comply, especially as the submission of
the Saxons took away from him his chief excuse for delay. He held a
synod at Mayence in October, and, as before, it was broken up by the
turbulence of the secular clergy. But the whole question was now to be
transferred to a larger stage, and the next act in the drama is the
Council of Worms.
In this struggle with the German episcopate, in which matters were
rapidly coming to a crisis, Gregory had been able to act unhampered by
royal interference, and so far his policy of effecting a reconciliation with
1 JafFe, Mon. Greg. ep. coll.
3. The same letter was sent as well to Archbishop
Werner of Magdeburg (ep. coll. 4) and to Bishop Otto of Constance (ep. coll. 5). There
seems little doubt that these letters should be dated February 1076 and not, as by Jaffe,
March 1074.
and in North Italy 63
Henry had justified itself. But in North Italy, where he required the
active co-operation rather than the non-interference of the king, the
policy had not been so successful. Little, however, could be expected
from Henry when his position in Germany itself was so difficult, and for
two years Gregory seems to have persisted in his confidence in the
king's
sincerity. He did complain, indeed, in December 1074 that Henry had
not yet taken any action with regard to Milan, and he administered a
gentle warning as to the councillors he had around him. But the more
personal letter he wrote at the same time gives expression to his
confidence in the king. In this letter he detailed his plan of leading a
vast
expedition to the East both to protect the Eastern Christians and to
bring them back to the orthodox faith; he is careful to seek Henry's
advice and assistance in this, because in the event of his going he
intends
to leave the Roman Church under Henry's care and protection. If he
could trust the king to this extent, he was profoundly suspicious of his
councillors and of their confederates the Lombard bishops.
At the Lenten
Synod of 1075, three Italian bishops were suspended for disobedience to
his summons, and five of Henry's councillors, promoters of simony, are
to
be excommunicated if they have not appeared in Rome and given
satisfaction by 1 June. At the same synod was passed the first decree
against
lay investiture.
Against the practice of lay ownership of churches, great and small,
the reformed Papacy had already raised its protest, and the necessity of
obtaining suitable agents for the work of reform had turned its
attention
to the method of appointment. While denying the right of the king to
control appointments, the Popes allowed him a considerable though
undefined role, both as head of the laity and as the natural protector
of
the Church. In this Gregory VII acquiesced, and where the appointments
were good from the spiritual point of view, as was the case in England
under William I, he was little disposed to question the method. It was
the insubordination of the episcopate in Germany and North Italy, and
especially the clash of papal and imperial claims at Milan, that led him
to take definite action against a royal control that led to bad appoint-
ments. The king, for his part, regarded bishoprics as being in his gift,
and allowed no bishop to exercise his functions until he had invested
him
with ring and staff. To the Church party the use of these symbols
betokened the conferring by the king of spiritual functions; this was an
abuse the removal of which might lead to the restoration of true
canonical
election. In Gregory VII's eyes it was clearly not an end in itself, but
only a step towards the end, which was through free election by clergy
and people to obtain a personnel adequate for its spiritual functions
and
amenable to Papal authority.
The importance of lay investiture had been early recognised by
Cardinal Humbert in his Liber Adversus Symoniacos, but Gregory VII was
the first Pope to legislate directly on the subject. The first decree
64 The first decree against lay investiture
prohibiting lay investiture (though not imposing any penalty on laymen
who invested) was passed at this synod in 1075. But it was never properly
published. Bishops elected and invested in 1075 and 1076 could plead
ignorance of its existence and the Pope accepted their plea. No German
writer seems to know of it, and we are indebted for its wording solely
to a Milanese writer, Arnulf, which gives weight to the suggestion that
the Milanese situation was principally responsible for the framing of the
decree.
The fact was that Gregory knew that he was dealing with a long-
established custom, regarded by the king as a prescriptive right, and he
knew that he must walk warily. He first of all sent the text of the
decree
to the king accompanied by a message to explain that it was no new step
that he was taking but a restoration of canonical practice, and urging
the king, if he felt his rights to be in any way infringed, to
communicate
with him, so that the matter could be arranged on a just and amicable
footing. Gregory attempted to establish his point by negotiation, and
he seems to have imagined that the king would -recognise the fairness of
his claim. Henry made no reply to these overtures, and the Pope does
not seem to have been immediately perturbed by this ominous silence. In
July he warmly praised the king for his zeal in resisting simony and
clerical marriage, which gives him reason, he says, to hope for still
higher
and better things — acquiescence, doubtless, in the new decree. Just
after
this, two ambassadors from Henry arrived in Rome with a strictly
confidential message to the Pope to be communicated to no one except the
king's mother Agnes, or Beatrice and Matilda of Tuscany. This has been
conjectured, with great probability, to have had reference to the king's
desire to be crowned Emperor by the Pope; if this be so we have a ready
explanation of his willingness to keep on good terms with the Pope, even
after his great victory over the Saxons in June. Gregory took some time
to reply, owing to illness; but, when he did, he warmly congratulated
the king on his victory over the rebels, and wrote in a tone of
confidence
that they were going to work together in harmony.
This was the last time that he expressed any such confidence, and in
the meantime the situation in Italy, especially at Milan, had been
getting
steadily worse. Revolt against the Pope was spreading in North Italy,
and Archbishop Guibert of Ravenna once more took the opportunity of
proclaiming the independence of his see. In Milan, Erlembald, the leader
of the Pataria and practical ruler of the city, had, in accordance with
the
Pope's appeal to the laity, forbidden the offending clergy to exercise
their
functions, which were usurped by a priest of his own party, Liutprand.
A riot ensued in which Erlembald was killed and Liutprand mutilated.
Their enemies in triumph reported the facts to Henry, and asked him to
appoint a new archbishop in place of his previous nominee Godfrey, from
whom he had practically withdrawn support. That Henry for some time
ignored this request may have encouraged the Pope in the confidence
that he expressed in August. But, with the situation in Germany be-
The events of the autumn of 1075 65
coming increasingly favourable, Henry seems to have felt himself strong
enough to follow his own inclinations, and to listen again to those coun-
cillors from whom Gregory had been most anxious to separate him. His
two ambassadors, who were still waiting instructions from him in Rome,
suddenly received a message at the beginning of September to make public
what he had previously wished to be a close secret, a discourtesy to the
Pope which the latter rightly felt to be ominous. And at the same time
he sent an embassy into Italy which revealed a complete change in his
policy. It was headed bv Count Eberhard of Nellenburg, who was almost
certainly one of the councillors placed under a ban bv the Pope. Its first
object was to make an alliance with the Lombard bishops and to attempt
to ally the king with the excommunicated Norman duke, Robert Guiscard.
Further, by royal authority, bishops were appointed to the vacant sees of
Fermo and Spoleto, sees which lay within the provincia Romana^. But
the main purpose of the embassy was to make a settlement of affairs at
Milan, so as completely to re-establish the old imperial authority.
Acceding to the request of the anti-Patarian party, Henry ignored both
his own nominee Godfrey and also Atto, whom the Pope recognised as
archbishop, and proceeded to invest one Tedald, who was consecrated
archbishop by the suffragans of Milan.
As in 1072, Henry so long
compliant deliberately provoked a rupture on the question of Milan. It
was an issue in which imperial and papal interests vitally conHicted, and
now that he was master once more in Gremiany it was an issue that he
felt himself strong enough to raise. Henry had revealed himself in his
true colom-s. The Pope's eyes were opened. He realised at last the meaning
of Henry's submission in 1073, and that it was due not to sincerity but
to defeat. It was clear that compliance could be expected from Henry
only when his fortunes were at a low ebb, and that at such times no re-
liance could be placed on his promises. The Pope's dream is at an end;
he is now awake to the realities of the situation, the bitter frustration of
all his hopes.
His tone to the usurper Tedald and his orders to the suffragan bishops of Milan were sharp and uncompromising. With the king he tried the effect of threats to see if they would succeed where persuasion had failed. By the king's own ambassadors he sent him a letter in which he summed up the leading offences of Henry — he is reported to be associating with his excommunicated councillors, and if this be true must do penance and seek absolution; he is certainly guilty with regard to Fermo and Spoleto and most culpable of all in his action at Milan, which was a direct breach of all his promises and a proof of the falseness of his pretended humility and obedience to Rome. A more mild rebuke follows for Henry's silence to his overtures regarding the investiture decree; if the king felt himself aggrieved he ought to have stated his grievances. Until he has given satisfaction on all these points, the king must expect no answer to his previous
• Hence Gregory's complaint that they were men unknown to him.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. ii. • 65
66 The Council of Worms, 24 January 1076
enquiry (again, doubtless, on the question of his coronation at Rome).
He concludes with a warning to the king to remember the fate of Saul,
who, like Henry, had displayed pride and disobedience after his victory ;
it is the humility of David that a righteous king must imitate. The letter
was stern, but not uncompromising; the message given to the ambassadors
to deliver by word of mouth was more direct. It amounted to a distinct
threat that, failing compliance, Henry must expect the sentence of
excommunication, and possibly of deposition also, to be pronounced
against him from the papal chair. This verbal message was in effect an
ultimatum.
The embassy reached Henry early in January 1076. He could not
brook threats of this nature when policy no longer required him to yield
to them. He had been humble to the Pope only until he had defeated
his other foe ; now that he was victorious, the need for humility was past,
and he could deal directly with the other enemy that was menacing the
imperial rights. His previous humiliation only made his desire for revenge
more keen, and his indignation demanded a speedy revenge. The bishops
he knew to be as bitter against the Pope as himself; and he summoned
them to a Council at Worms on 24 January. The short notice given in
the summons must have prevented the attendance of several, such as
Archbishop Liemar, who would gladly have been present; even so, two
archbishops, Siegfried of Mayence and Udo of Treves, and twenty-four
bishops, subscribed their names to the proceedings. There was no need
for persuasion or deliberation.
They readily^ renounced allegiance to the
Pope, and concocted a letter addressed to him in which they brought
forward various charges (of adultery, perjury, and the like) to blacken his
character, but laid their principal stress on the only serious charge they
could bring — his treatment of the episcopate. The king composed a letter
on his own account, making the bishops^ cause his own, and indignantly
repudiating Gregory's claim to exercise authority over himself, who as
the Lord's anointed was above all earthly judgment, ordered him to de-
scend from the Papal throne and yield it to a more worthy occupant. The
next step was to obtain the adhesion of the North Italian bishops,
which was very readily given at a council at Piacenza, and to Roland
of Parma was entrusted the mission of delivering to the Pope the
sentence of deposition pronounced by the king and the bishops of the
Empire.
At Christmas 1075 had occurred the outrage of Cencius, who laid
violent hands on the Pope and hurried him, a prisoner, into a fortress of
his own. Gregory was rescued by the Roman populace, and had to inter-
vene to prevent them from tearing his captor in pieces. The horror
aroused at this incident gave an added reverence to the peivson of the Pope,
and it was in these circumstances, and while the Lenten Synod was about
to commence its deliberations, that Roland of Parma arrived. The message
1 Except Bishop Herman of Metz, who was doubtless coerced iuto siguiug.
Lenten Synod at Rome. Excommunication of Henry IV 67
which he delivered to the assembled synod was an outrage beside which
that of Cencius paled into insignificance. It shocked the general feeling
of the day, which was accordingly prejudiced on the Pope's side at the
commencement of the struggle.
At the synod itself there was a scene of
wild disorder and uproar. The Pope, depressed at the final ruin of his
hopes and at the prospect of the struggle before him, alone remained
calm ;
he intervened to protect Roland from their fury, and succeeded at last
in
quieting the assembly and recalling it to its deliberations. The verdict
was assured and he proceeded to pass sentence on his aggressors.
Arch-bishop Siegfried and the other German bishops that subscribed are
sentenced to deposition and separated from communion with the Church;
a proviso is added giving the opportunity to those who had been coerced
into signing to make their peace before 1 August. The same sentence is
passed on the Lombard bishops. Finally he deals with the king in an
impressive utterance addressed to St Peter, in whose name he declares
him deposed and absolves his subjects from their oath of allegiance; and
then he bans him from the communion of the Church, recounting his
various offences — communicating with the excommunicated councillors;
his many iniquities; his contempt of Papal warnings; his breach of the
unity of the Church by his attack on the Pope.
The hasty violence and the fantastic charges of the king and the bishops
contrasted very strikingly with the solemn and deliberate sentence of the
Pope. Confident himself in the justice of his action, there were some who
doubted, and for these he wrote a circular letter detailing the events that
led to Henry's excommunication.
The facts spoke for themselves, but
there were still some who continued to doubt whether in any
circumstances the Pope had the right to excommunicate the king; to
convince
these he wrote a letter to Bishop Herman of Metz (who had hastened to
make his peace with the Pope for his enforced signature at Worms), in
which he justifies himself by precedents, by the power given to St
Peter,
and by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers. It is rather a
hurried
letter, in which he answers briefly and somewhat impatiently several
questions put to him by Herman. He makes it quite clear, however,
that he regards the spiritual power as superior to the temporal, and
that
his authority extends over all temporal rulers. Henceforward there is no
sign of his earlier attitude which seemed to imply adherence to the
Gelasian standpoint; he is now the judge who decides whether the king
is doing that which is right (i.e. is worthy to be king), and the test
of
right-doing is obedience to the Papal commands. One point calls for
remark. It is only the excommunication that he justifies. The sentence
of
deposition plays little part in 1076 ; it is not a final sentence as in
1080,
and even by Henry's enemies in Germany, who considered this to be a
question rather for them to decide, little attention is paid to this
part of
the sentence. Probably in the Pope's eyes it was subsidiary; deposition
and the absolving of the king's subjects from their oath of allegiance
was
68 Results of the excommunication
a necessary consequence of excommunication in order to save from the
same penalty the subjects of the excommunicated king. As is clear from
his letter to Bishop Herman, he contemplated the absolution of the
king as a possibility in the near future, and he did not at present
contemplate the appointment of a successor to Henry.
The king received intelligence of the Papal sentence at Easter, and
immediately summoned a council to meet at Worms on Whitsunday. The
crisis had been reached. The king had ordered the Pope to descend from
St Peter's chair; the Pope treated the king as contumacious, excommuni-
cated him, and declared him to be no longer king. Which was to prevail.?
The answer to this was quickly given. The papal ban was seen to be
speedily efficacious. It frightened the more timid of Henry's adherents,
it impressed moderate men who had been horrified by the king's attack on
the Pope. Moreover it gave the excuse for revolt to raise its head in
Saxony once more, and to win adherents from among the higher nobility
in the rest of Germany, alienated by the high-handed measures of the
king in his moment of triumph and resenting their own lack of influence
in the affairs of the kingdom. The situation in Germany is dealt with in
another chapter. Here it is enough to say that Henry found himself
isolated, and faced by a coalition far more dangerous to his power than
the
revolt of 1073.
His summons to councils at Worms and Mayence were ignored, and the bishops of Germany were hastening to make their peace with the Pope, either directly or indirectly through the papal legate, Bishop Altmann of Passau. Only in North Italy were his adherents still faithful, and with them it was not possible for him to join forces. The imperial authority was humiliated between the encroachments of the spiritual power on the one hand, and the decentralising policy of the leading nobles on the other. At the Diet of princes held at Tribur in October these two powers came to terms for mutual action. Two papal legates were present, and the Pope's letter of the previous month, in which for the first time he contemplates the possibility of a successor to Henry, was probably before the diet. He insists in that event on being consulted as to their choice, requiring careful information as to personal character; he claims that the Apostolic See has the right of confirm- ing the election made by the nobles. Such a right was not likely to be conceded by them, but to obtain Papal support they were willing to satisfy him essentially. Henry was forced to send a solemn promise of obedience to the Pope and of satisfaction for his offences, and to promulgate his change of mind to all the nobles, lay and ecclesiastical, of the kingdom. The diet then arrived at two important decisions. Accepting the justice of Henry's excommunication, they agreed that if he had not obtained absolution by 22 February they would no longer recognise him as king. Secondly, they summoned a council to be held at Augsburg on 2 February, at which they invited the Pope to be present and to preside; at this council the question of Henry's worthiness to reign was to be
Henry's journey to Canossa 69
decided and, if necessary, the choice of a successor was to be made. These
decisions were communicated to the Pope, and also to Henry, who was
remaining on the other side of the river at Oppenheim, carefully watched,
with only a few attendants, almost a prisoner.
The Pope received the news with delight and accepted the invitation
with alacrity. It meant for him the realisation of his aims and the
exhibition to the world of the relative impoiiance of the spiritual and
temporal powers; Pope Gregory VII sitting in judgment on King
Henry IV would efface the unhappy memory of King Henry III sitting
in judgment on Pope Gregory VI thirty years before.
He left Rome in
December and travelled north into Lombardy. But the escort promised
him from Germany did not aiTive, and the news reached him that Henry
had crossed the Alps and was in Italy, Uncertain as to the king's
intentions and fully aware of the hostility of the Lombards, he took
refuge
in Countess Matilda's castle of Canossa.
The king was in a desperate position. He could expect little mercy from the council of his enemies at Augsburg in Februarv. The conjunction of the Pope and the German nobles was above all things to be avoided. The only resource left to him was to obtain absolution, and to obtain it from the Pope in Italy, before he arrived in Germany. To effect this a humiliation even more abject than that of 1073 was necessary: he must appear in person before the Pope not as a king but as a penitent sinner; it would be hard for the Pope to refuse absolution to a humble penitent. His decision arrived at, he acted with singular courage and resolution. He had to elude the close vigilance of the nobles and escape from his present confinement ; as they were guarding the other passes into Italy, only the Mont Cenis pass was left to him, which was in the control of his wife's family, the counts of Savoy ; but the winter was one of the most severe on record, and the passage of the Mont Cenis pass was an undertaking that might have daunted the hardiest mountaineer. All these difficulties Henry overcame, and with his wife, his infant son, and a few personal attendants he reached the plains of Lombardy. Here he found numerous supporters, militant anti-Papalists, eager to flock to his banner. It was a serious temptation, but his good sense shewed him that it would ultimately have been fatal, and he resisted it. With his meagre retinue he continued his journey until he arrived at the gates of Canossa, where the final difficulty was to be overcome, the obtaining of the Papal absolution. To this end he strove to obtain the intercession of his god-father Abbot Hugh of Cluny, of the Countess Matilda, of any of those present whose influence might prevail with the Pope. And he carried out to the full his design of throwing off the king and appearing as the sinner seeking absolution; bare-footed, in the woollen garb of the penitent, for three days he stood humbly in the outer courtyard of Canossa. There are few moments in history that have impressed later genera-
70 Canossa
tions so much ^ as this spectacle of the heir to the Empire standing in the
courtyard of Canossa, a humble suppliant for Papal absolution. But it
is within the castle that we must look for the real drama of Canossa.
Paradoxical as it sounds, it was the king who had planned and achieved
this situation ; the plans of the Pope were upset by this sudden appearance, his mind was unprepared for the emergency.
The three days of
waiting are not so much the measure of Henry's humiliation as of
Gregory's irresolution. Could he refuse absolution to one so humble and
apparently so penitent? The influence of those on whom he was wont to
lean for spiritual help, especially the Abbot of Cluny, urged him to
mercy; the appeal of the beloved Countess Matilda moved him in the
same direction. But they only saw a king in penitential garb; he had
the bitter experience of the last two years to guide him, and what
confidence could he feel that the penitence of Henry was more sincere
now,
when his need was greater, than it had been in 1073.'^ He saw before him
too the prospect of the wrecking of all his hopes, the breach of his
engagement with the German nobles, which would probably result
from an absolution given in circumstances that neither he nor they had
contemplated. His long hesitation was due, then, to the conflict in his
mind; it was not a deliberate delay designed to increase to the utm^t
the
degradation of the king.
But at last the appeal to the divine mercy prevailed over all other
considerations. The doors were opened and Henry admitted to the Pope's
presence; the ban was removed, and the king was received once more
into communion with the Church. From him the Pope extracted such
assurances of his penitence and guarantees for his future conduct as
would
justify the absolution and at the same time leave the situation as far
as
possible unaltered from the Papal point of view. With his hand on the
Gospels the king took an oath to follow the Pope's directions with
regard
to the charges of the German nobles against him, whichever way they
might tend, and further by no act or instigation of his to impede
Gregory from coming into Germany or to interfere with his safe-conduct
while there. The Pope sent a copy of this oath to the German nobles
with a letter 2 describing the events at Canossa. He realised that the
absolution of Henry in Italy would appear to them in the light of a
betrayal of the compact he had entered into with them. His letter is an
explanation, almost an apology of his action; while he points out that
• Or contemporary opinion so little. Bismarck's famous words "zu Canossa gehen wir nicht" indicate the aspect of Canossa that impresses the modern mind. But the brief allusions to Canossa in contemporary writers only refer to the king's absolution and its political results; it did not occur to them that the monarchy had been degraded by Henry's action. His seat on the throne had been shaken by the excommunication ; he righted himself by his penance at Canossa.
2 This letter '(Reg. iv, 12) is our only real authority for the details of Canossa.
Lampert of Hersfeld's account is clearly based on the Pope's letter, with characteristic
embellishments of his own invention.
The election of Rudolf as anti-king 71
the non-appearance of the promised escort had prevented him from
reaching Germany, he is careful to insist firstly that it was impossible for
him to refuse absolution, secondly that he has entered into no engagement
with the king and that his purpose is as before to be present at a council
in Germany. He lingered, in fact, for some months in North Italy,
waiting for the escort that never came; at last he resigned himself to the
inevitable and slowlv retraced his steps to Rome, which he reached at the
beginning of September.
Henry's plan had been precisely fulfilled. He had counted the cost —
a public humiliation — and was prepared to pay the additional price in the
form of promises; he had obtained his end — absolution — and the results
he had anticipated from this were to prove the success of his policy ^ In
Lombardy he resumed his royal rights, but resisted the clamour of his
Italian adherents, whose ardour he most thoroughly disappointed; he
must still walk with great discretion, and Germany, not Italy, was his
immediate objective. Thither he soon returned, and the effects of his
absolution were at once revealed. By the majority of his subjects he was
regarded as the lawful sovereign once more. He had endured a grave
injury to imperial prestige, but he had administered an important check
to the two dangerous rivals of imperial power — the spiritual authority
and the feudal nobility.
The news of Henry's absolution came as a shock to his enemies in
Germany, upsetting their plans and disappointing their expectations.
Nor were they comforted by the Pope's effort to reassure them. They
decided, however, to proceed with their original purpose and to hold a
diet at Forchheim in March. Their invitation to the Pope to be present
at this diet must have contained a reference to their disappointment at
his action, for in his reply he finds it necessary to justify himself
again,
laying stress also on their failure to provide an escort. This was still
the
difficulty that prevented him from coming to Germany, but he sent two
Papal legates who were present at Forchheim, and who seem on their own
responsibility to have confirmed the decision of the nobles and to have
given papal sanction to the election of Duke Rudolf of Swabia as king.
The election of Rudolf created a difficult situation, but one full of
possibilities for the Pope which he was not slow to recognise. He
refused,
indeed, to confirm the action of his legates at Forchheim, but he
recognised the existence of two kings and claimed for himself the
decision
between them. If he could establish this claim and obtain acquiescence
in his decision, the predominance of the spiritual power would be
revealed
as a fact. His decision must not be humed; it must be given only after
clear evidence and on the spiritual and moral grounds which were the
justification of the supremacy he claimed. Righteousness must be the
supreme test ; he will give his decision to the king cui iustitia favet.
^ This is very clearly stated by the writer most favourable to him, Vita Heinrici
imperatoris, c. 3, SGUS, p. 16.
72 The Pope's neutrality
Again and again he emphasised this, and that the marks of iustitia were
humility and obedience, obedience to the commandments of God and so
to St Peter, and through St Peter to himself. Obedience to the Pope was
to be the final test of worthiness to rule, and he gave one practical
application of this principle. He still continued for a time to cherish
the
hope that he would preside in person over a council in Germany; when
this was proved impossible, his plan was to send legates to preside in
his
place. From both kings he expected assistance. The king who was
convicted of hindering the holding of the council would be deposed, and
judgment given in favour of the other; for as Gregory the Great had
said,
"even kings lose their thrones if they presume to oppose apostolic
decrees.'"*
Naturally his attitude gave intense dissatisfaction to both
Henry and Rudolf; neither felt strong enough to stand alone, and both
expected Papal support. Henry urged the Pope to excommunicate the
traitor Rudolf, who had presumed to set himself up against God's
anointed.
The supporters of Rudolf were equally persistent. The Pope had absolved
them from their allegiance to Henry. In conformity with this they had
made a compact with him for joint action, a compact which they felt he
had broken by his absolution of Henry. They had persisted, however,
with the scheme and had elected Rudolf, and papal legates had been
present and confirmed the election. Moreover, a garbled version of
Canossa soon prevailed among them, which made it appear that the king
had been granted absolution on conditions (distinct from those in his
oath)
which he had immediately broken, and was thereby again excommunicate.
In this view they were again supported by the papal legates, who
continued
to embarrass the Pope by exceeding their instructions. Rudolf and his
supporters can hardly be blamed for interpreting the action of the
legates
as performed on behalf of the Pope and by his orders. His continued
neutrality and his constant reference to two kings only bewildered and
irritated them. He persisted, however, in neutrality, undeterred by the
complaints of either side, determined to take no action until the
righteousness of one party or the absence of it in the other could be
made apparent.
But there could never have been much doubt as to the final decision. He
always shewed complete confidence in Rudolfs rectitude; his previous
experience could have given him little confidence in Henry. The three
days' hesitation at Canossa had ended when he allowed himself to be
assured of Henry's penitence; the hesitation of the three years
following
Canossa was to be resolved when he could feel complete assurance of
Henry's guilt.
From 1077 to 1080 the decision in Germany is naturally the chief
object of the Pope's attention. This did not divert his mind from the
important questions of Church government and papal authority, but to
some extent it hampered and restricted his actions; it would appear that
he was cai*eful to avoid any cause of friction with Henry which might
compromise the settlement of the great decision. His authority was set
Papal legislation, 1078-1079 73
at naught by the bishops of North Italy, who refused to execute his
decrees
and defied his repeated excommunications. In Germany there is hardly a
trace of the struggle that had been so bitter in 1074 and 1075; this was
mainly due to the confusion arising from the state of civil war.
Probably
too the German episcopate was not anxious to engage in another trial
of strength with the Pope. Their revolt at Worms had resulted in
bringing them in submission to the Pope's feet, and their leader,
Arch-bishop Siegfried of Mavence, had given up all further thoughts of
revolt
against him. He had even abandoned his royal master and had consecrated
Rudolf as king; his instinct in every crisis for the losing side
remained with him to the end. In Gregory's correspondence during this
period there is an almost complete absence of reference to
ecclesiastical
affairs in Grermany. At the same time it is the period of his chief
legislative activity.
At the Lenten and November Synods of 1078, especially
at the latter, he issued a number of decrees dealing with the leading
questions of Church discipline, most of which were subsequently
incorporated
by Gratian into his Decretum. The increased stringency of the measures
taken to deal with ecclesiastical offenders is the principal feature of
these
decrees. Bishops are ordered to enforce clerical chastity in their
dioceses,
under penalty of suspension. The sacraments of married clergy had
previously been declared invalid, and the laity ordered not to hear the
mass of a married priest ; now entry into churches is forbidden to
married
clergy. All ordinations, simoniacal or otherwise uncanonical, are
declared
null and void, as are the orders of those ordained by excommunicated
bishops. Naturally, then, the ordinations of simoniacal bishops are
invalid ;
an exception is made in the case of those ordained nescienter et sine
pretio
by simoniacal bishops before the Papacy of Nicholas II, who, after the
laying-on of hands, might be confirmed in their orders^ As to the
enforcement of these decrees by the Pope we hear nothing; but they
raised
issues which were to be seriously contested after his death, and his
immediate successors were eventually to take less extreme views.
Further, the
Pope dealt with the unlawful intervention of the laity in ecclesiastical
affairs. Not only are the laity sternly prohibited from holding Church
property or tithes; a decree is also passed in November 1078 condemning
the
practice of lay investiture. It is noticeable that it only prohibits
investi-
ture with the spiritual office, and that it enforces penalties only on
the
recipients, not on the laity who invest. Finally, there were a number of
decrees connected with points of doctrine, the most important of which
was
issued after considerable debate at the Lenten Synod of 1079, affirming
the substantial change of the elements after consecration. It was an
answer to the heresy of Berengar of Tours, who is compelled once more to
recant; Gregory as before shewed great leniency in dealing with him, and
actually threatened with excommunication anyone who should molest him.
1 Reg. VI, 39. Saltet, Les Reordinations, pp. 205 sq., fails to notice
this important letter, and therefore forms a different conclusion as to
Gregory's attitude.
74 Excommunication and deposition of Henry II, 1080
All this legislation, important as it was and fruitful in future
controversies, was subsidiary to the question of the German kingdom,
which at
every synod took the leading place. Gregory was continually striving to
bring about the council in Germany over which his legates were to
preside.
Both kings promised to co-operate and to abide by the decision of the
legates; both promised an escort to ensure the safe-conduct of the
legates.
But nothing was done by either; Rudolf was doubtless unable, Henry
was certainly unwilling. There was in consequence a strong feeling at
the
Lenten Synod of 1079 that the Pope should immediately decide for Rudolf.
Gregory, however, persevered and contented himself with renewed
promises,
guaranteed by oath, from the ambassadors of both kings. Henry was
becoming impatient. As his position in Germany grew more secure, his
need to conciliate the Pope became less urgent. At the Lenten Synod of
1080 his ambassadors appeared not with promises but with the demand,
accompanied probably by threats, that the Pope should immediately
excommunicate Rudolf; Rudolfs ambassadors replied with a string of
charges against Henry, to prove his unrighteousness and insincerity. The
Pope could remain neutral no longer. Henry's embassy had provided the
evidence he required to prove the king's breach of faith. Against Henry
the decision was given.
The proceedings of the synod commenced with a renewal of the decree
against lay investiture, accompanied, now that negotiation with Henry
was at an end, by a further decree threatening with excommunication the
lay power that presumed to confer investiture of bishopric or abbey.
A
third decree enforced the pure canonical election of bishops, and
provided
that, where this was in any way vitiated, the power of election should
devolve on the Pope or the metropolitan. The synod terminated with
the pronouncement of the papal decision on the German kingdom. Again
in the form of a solemn address, this time with added effect to both
St Peter and St Paul, Gregory dwells on his reluctance at every stage in
his
advancement to the papal chair, and recounts the history of his
relations
with Henry during the three preceding years, marking the insincerity of
the king and his final disobedience in the matter of the council, which,
with
the ruin and desolation he had caused in Germany, proved his
unrighteousness and unfitness to reign. Then follows the sentence —
Henry, for his
pride, disobedience, and falsehood, is excommunicated, deposed from his
kingdom, and his subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance. Rudolf
by his humility, obedience, truthfulness, is revealed as the righteous
man;
to him the kingdom, to which he had been elected by the Gernian people,
is entrusted by the Pope acting in the name of the two Apostles, to whom
he appeals for a vindication of his just sentence.
The sentence has a ring of finality in it that was not present in 1076. Henry is now deposed for ever and a successor appointed in his place. So it is on the deposition that the main emphasis is laid, as it was on the excommunication in 1076.
Gregory's justification of his action is again addressed
The Pope's justification of his sentence. Its effect 75
to Bishop Herman of Metz, though not written till the following year.
Unlike the similar letter of 1076 it shews no sign of haste or impatience;
it is a reasoned statement, full of quotations from precedent and authority,
and is concerned mainlv with emphasising the complete subjection of the
secular to the spiritual power, for even the lowest in the ecclesiastical
hierarchy have powers which are not given to the greatest Emperors. It
is a mighty assertion of the unlimited autocracy of the Pope over all men,
even the sreatest, on earth. And it was an assertion of authority in the
justice of which Gregory had the supremest confidence. In the sentence
he had praved that Henry might acquire no strength in war, no victory
in his lifetime. He followed this up on Easter Monday by his famous
prophecy that Henry, if he did not repent, would be dead or deposed
before St Peter''s dav. He felt assured that the easy victory of 1076 would
be repeated. But the situation was entirely different from that in 1076,
as also the issue was to be. Then opinion in Germany had been shocked
by the violence and illegality of the king in attempting to expel the Pope.
The Papal excommunication had been obeyed as a just retribution ; to the
sentence of deposition little attention had been paid. As soon as the king
was absolved he received again the allegiance of all those who were in
favour of legitimacy and a strong central authority, and were opposed to
the local ambitions of the dukes who set up Rudolf. The Pope's claim
to have the deciding voice was not regarded very seriously by them, and
still less attention was paid to his assertion of the complete autocracy of
the spiritual power.
When Henry would do nothing to make possible
the council that the Pope so earnestly desired, his action was doubtless
approved bv them; and when the Pope in consequence excommunicated
and deposed the king and appointed Rudolf in his place, he aroused
very wide-spread indignation. It is Gregory who is the aggressor now,
as Henry was in 1076; it is he that is regarded now as exceeding his
powers in attempting to dethrone the temporal head of Western Christen-
dom. The situation is completely reversed, and it is not too much to say
that as a result of the Papal sentence Henry's power in Germany became
stronger than it had been for some years.
Henry was probably more alive than Gregory to the real facts of the
situation. Rapidly, but with less precipitancy than he had shewn in 1076,
he planned his counter-stroke. A council of German bishops held at
Mayence on Whitsunday decreed the deposition of the Pope and arranged
another council to be held at Brixen on 25 June, where a successor to
Gregory was to be appointed. To this council the bishops of North Italy
came in large numbers; the king was present and many nobles both of
Germany and Italy. The bishops confirmed the Mayence decree and
unanimously declared Gregory deposed; to the royal power was entrusted
the task of executing the sentence. They also proceeded to the election
of a successor, and their choice fell on Archbishop Guibert of Ravenna,
the leader of the Lombard bishops in their revolt against Papal authority.
76 Council of Brixen,
The anti-Pope Guibert
A man of strong determination, resolute in upholding the independence
he claimed for his see, he had been repeatedly summoned to Rome by the
Pope, and for his absence and contumacy repeatedly excommunicated.
Though violently attacked by Papalist writers and likened to the beast in
the Apocalypse, no charges were made against his personal character; he
seems also to have been in sympathy with Church reform, as his decrees
shew.
A stubborn opponent of Gregory, unmoved by Papal excommunications, he
was eminently the man for Henry's purpose in the final struggle
that had now begun. For it was a struggle that admitted of no compromise
— king and anti-Pope versus Pope and anti-king. St Peter's day
came and Gregory's prophecy was not fulfilled; in October Rudolf was
killed in battle. It was now possible for Henry to take in hand the
execution of the Brixen decree, and to use the temporal weapon to expel
the deposed Pope.
Even before the Council of Brixen met, Gregory had realised the danger
that threatened him. Spiritual weapons were of avail no longer; he must
have recourse to the aid of temporal power. The Romans, he knew, were
loyal to him and would resist the invader. In Tuscany he could rely
absolutely on the devotion of Countess Matilda, but against this must be
set the hostility of Lombardy. To restore the balance in his favour he
was driven to seek assistance from the Normans in South Italy. He knew
that they would welcome the alliance if he was willing to pay their price.
The issues at stake were so vital to the Papacy and the Church that he
felt justified in consenting to the price they demanded, though it involved
what in other circumstances he would have regarded as an important
breach of principle.
To understand this it is necessary to review briefly
his relations with the Normans during the past seven years.
The relations of the Pope with the Normans were affected by two
considerations — the protection of Papal territory, and the possible need
for their assistance. Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia, Calabria, and
Sicily, who was trying to form a centralised Norman state in South
Italy, had readily done homage to previous Popes in return for the
cession of teiritory, and had rendered valuable assistance to the Papacy
at Alexander IPs accession. Gregory was determined to yield no more ter-
ritory. This and the reconciliation with Henry were the two chief objects
of his attention during the first few months of his papacy. He increased
the area of papal suzerainty by the addition of the lands belonging to
the surviving Lombard rulers in the south, especially Benevento and
Salerno; in return for his protection they surrendered them to the Pope
and received them back again as fiefs from the Papacy. Richard, Prince
of Capua, the only Norman who could rival Robert Guiscard, took the
same step, and Gregory was delighted at the success of his policy, which
was, as he himself declared, to keep the Normans from uniting to the
damage of the Church. Robert Guiscard, desiring to expand his power,
could only do so at the expense of Papal territory. This, in spite of his
Alliance of the Pope with Robert Guiscard 77
oath, he did not scruple to do, and was in consequence excommunicated
at the Lenten Synods of 1074 and 1075. But the breach with Henry in
1076 caused the Pope to contemplate the desirability of Norman aid;
Robert made the cession of Papal territory a necessary condition, and
negotiations fell through. Moreover Richard of Capua had in the meantime
broken his allegiance and allied himself with Robert Guiscard, and
together they made a successful attack on various portions of the Papal
territory.
In Lent 1078 the Pope issued a bull of excommunication against
them once more. Richard died soon afterwards and on his death-bed was
reconciled with the Church; his son Jordan came to Rome and made his
peace with the Pope on the old terms. So once more Gregory had brought
about disunion; and a serious revolt of his vassals against Robert Guiscard,
which it took the latter two years to quell, saved the Pope from further
Norman aggression. The revolt was extinguished by the middle of 1080, at
the very moment that the Pope decided to appeal to Robert for aid. They
met at Ceprano in June. The ban was removed, Robert did fealty to the
Pope, and in return received investiture both of the lands granted him by
Popes Nicholas II and Alexander II and of the territory he had himself
seized, for which he agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Pope. The
Pope thus confirmed what he is careful to call "an unjust tenure," and
to gain Robert's aid sacrificed the principle for which he had stood firm
in 1076. Whether justifiable or not the sacrifice was ineffectual. Robert
Guiscard welcomed the alliance because his ambitions were turned to the
East. Instead of obtaining the immediate help he required, the Pope had
to give his blessing to Robert's expedition against the Eastern Empire.
The duke's absence in Greece gave the opportunity for a renewed outbreak
of revolt among his vassals. This forced him to return and he was not
successful in crushing the revolt until July 1083; it was not till the
following year, when it was as much to his own interest as to the Pope's
to
check the successful advance of Henry, that he at last moved to
Gregory's
support. Up to this time the alliance, without bringing any advantage
to the Pope, had actually assisted the king. It gained for him two
useful
allies, both of whom were anxious to hamper the power of Robert Guiscard
— Jordan of Capua and the Eastern Emperor Alexius. The latter
supplied Henry with large sums of money, intended for use against
Robert,
but which the king was eventually to employ with success in his
negotiations with the Romans.
Robert Guiscard did at any rate, as previously in 1075, reject Henry's
proposals for an alliance. But he also disregarded the Pope's appeals, and
set sail for the East at the very time that Henry was marching on Rome.
The Pope therefore had to rely on his own resources and the assistance
of Countess Matilda. This did not weaken his determination ; convinced
of the righteousness of his cause he was confident of the result. At the
Lenten Synod of 1081 he excommunicated Henry and his followei-s afresh,
and from this synod he sent his legates directions with regard to the
78 Siege of Rome by Henry II
election of a successor to Rudolf. He must not be hastily chosen ; the
chief qualifications must be integrity of character and devotion to the
Church. The Pope also sent them the wording of the oath he expected
from the new king — an oath of fealty, promising obedience to the papal
will in all things. This was the practical expression of the theories he
enunciated at the same time in his letter to Bishop Herman of Metz
justifying the excommunication and deposition of Henry. It is important
as marking the culmination of his views, but it was without effect; at the
new election it seems to have been completely disregarded.
The weakness of the opposition in Germany made it possible for
Henry to undertake his Italian expedition. He came to assert his
position, and to obtain imperial coronation at Rome: by negotiation and
from Gregory, if possible, but if necessary by force and from his
anti-Pope.
His first attempt was in May 1081; whether from over-confidence or
necessity he brought few troops with him. He announced his arrival in a
letter to the Romans, recalling them to the allegiance they had promised
to his father. The Romans, however, justified Gregory's confidence in their
loyalty, and Henry was forced to retire after a little aimless plundering
of the suburbs. The situation was not affected by the election of Count
Herman of Salm at the end of 1081 as successor to Rudolf. Henry
could not reduce Saxony to submission, but he could safely ignore
Herman and resume his Italian design. He reappeared before Rome in
February 1082, preceded by a second letter to the Romans; this attempt
was as unsuccessful as the former one, and for the rest of the year he was
occupied with the resistance of the Countess Matilda in northern Italy.
He returned to Rome at the beginning of 1083 and settled down to
besiege the Leonine City, which he finally captured in June, thus gaining
possession of St Peter's and all the region on the right bank of the Tiber
except the castle of Sant' Angelo. This success shewed that the loyalty of
the Romans to Gregory was weakening; they were not equal to the strain
of a long siege, and the money supplied by the Emperor Alexius was
beginning to have its effect. At the same time a moderate party was
being formed within the Curia itself, which managed to obtain the Papal
consent to the holding of a synod in November, at which the questions at
issue between Pope and king were to be discussed; Henry's party was
approached and promised a safe-conduct to those who attended the synod.
Thus in both camps there were influences at work to procure a peaceful
settlement. The king himself was not averse to such a settlement. He had
moreover come to a private understanding with the leading Romans on
the matter of greatest importance to himself. Unknown to the Pope they
had taken an oath to Henry to obtain for him imperial coronation at
Gregory's hands, or, failing this, to disown Gregory and recognise the anti-
Pope.
The attempt at reconciliation came to nothing. The Pope issued
his summons to the synod, but the tone of his letters, addressed only to
His victory. The Norman sack of Rome 79
those who were not under excommunication, shewed that he would not
compromise his views or negotiate with the impenitent. The king, who
had been further irritated by what he regarded as the treachery of certain
of the Romans in demolishing some fortifications he had constructed,
adopted an attitude equally intransigeant. He deliberately prevented
Gregory's chief supporters from coming to the synod, and actually took
prisoner a papal legate, the Cardinal-bishop Otto of Ostia. The synod,
therefore, was poorly attended and entirely without result. But the
secret negotiations of Henry were more successful. He was about to leave
Rome, in despair of attaining his object, when a deputation arrived
promising him instant possession of the main city. With some hesitation
he retraced his steps to find the promise genuine and his highest hopes
unexpectedly fulfilled.
On 21 March 1084 he entered Rome in triumph
with his anti-Pope. A council of his supporters decreed anew the deposition
of Pope Gregory VII, and on Palm Sunday Guibert was enthroned^ as
Pope Clement III. On Easter Day the new Pope crowned Henry and
Bertha as Emperor and Empress, and Henry' s chief object was attained.
He had followed in the footsteps of his father — the deposition of Pope
Gregory, the appointment of Pope Clement, the imperial coronation — and
felt that he had restored the relations of Empire and Papacy as they existed
in 1046.
The Emperor proclaimed his triumph far and wide, and his partisans
celebrated it in exultant pamphlets. But their rejoicing was premature
and short-lived. Gregory VII was still holding the castle of Sanf Angelo
and other ofthe fortified positions in Rome, his determination unmoved
by defeat. And at last his appeals to Robert Guiscard were heeded. The
Norman duke at the head of a large army advanced on Rome. As he
approached, Henry, who was not strong enough to oppose him, retreated,
and by slow stages made his wav back to Germany, leaving the anti-Pope
at Tivoli. His immediate purpose had been achieved, and he had to
abandon Rome to its fate. He could not, like his father, take the deposed
Pope with him to Germany; the degradation of Gregory VII was to be
the work of the man who came to his rescue. The brutal sack of Rome by
the Normans lasted for three days, and put in the shade the damage done
to the city in former days by Goths and Vandals. When Robert Guiscard
returned south he took with him the Pope, whom he could not have left
to the mercy of the infuriated populacej Gregory would fain have found
a refuge at Monte Cassino; but his rescuer, now his master, hurried him
on (as if to display to him the Papal territory that had been the price of
this deliverance), first to Benevento and then to Salerno. In June they
arrived at the latter place, where Gregory was to spend the last year of
his life, while the anti-Pope was able quietly to return to Rome and
celebrate Christmas there. At Salerno the Pope held his last synod,
^ It added to the weakness of Guibert's position that the functions of the cardinal-
bishops at this ceremony were usurped by the Bishops of Alodena and Arezzo.
80 Death of Pope Gregory VII
repeated once more his excommunication of Henry and his supporters, and
dispatched his final letter of justification and appeal to the Christian
world. The bitterness of failure hung heavily upon him. He, who had
prayed often that God would release him from this life if he could not
be
of service to the Churchy had now no longer any desire to live. He
passed away on 25 May 1085, and the anguish of his heart found
expression in his dying words: "I have loved righteousness and hated
iniquity^;
therefore I die in exile."
The emphasis was on righteousness to the last. And it was justified.
Had he consented to compromise his principles and to come to terms with
Henry he could have maintained himself unchallenged on the Papal throne.
The rough hand of the Norman had made his residence at Rome impossible;
but without Norman aid it would have been equally impossible.
The Romans had deserted him; the king was master of the city. His end
might even have been more terrible, though it could not have been more
tragic. What impresses one most of all is not his temporary defeat,
but the quenching of his spirit. The old passionate confidence has gone;
though still convinced of the righteousness of his cause, he has lost
all hope of its victory on earth. "The devil," he wrote, "has won no
such victory since the days of the great Constantine ; the nearer the
day
of Anti-Christ approaches, the more vigorous are the efforts he is
making."
His vision was dimmed by the gloom of the moment, and this gave him
a pessimistic outlook that was unnatural to him and was not justified by
facts. The Papacy had vindicated its independence, had taken the lead in
Church reform, and had established the principles for which tlie reformers
had been fighting. It had also asserted its authority as supreme within
the ecclesiastical department, and exercised a control unknown before and
not to be relaxed in the future. This was largely the work of Gregory VH.
The great struggle too in which he was engaged with Henry IV was to
end eventually in a complete victory for the Papacy; his antagonist was
to come to an end even more miserable than his own. The great theories
which he had evolved in the course of this struggle were not indeed to be
followed up in practice by his immediate successors. But he left a great
cause behind him, and his claims were repeated and defended in the
pamphlet-warfare that followed his death. Later they were to be
revived again and to raise the Papacy to its greatest height ; but they were
to lead to eventual disaster, as the ideal which had inspired them was for-
gotten. They were with Gregory VII the logical expression of his great
ideal — the rule of righteousness upon earth. He had tried to effect this
with the aid of the temporal ruler; when that was proved impossible, he
tried to enforce it against him. The medieval theory of the two equal and
independent powers had proved impracticable; Gregory inaugurated the
new Papal theory that was to take its place.
» As he tells Hugh of Cluny in 1075. « Psalm xlv. 8.
Gregorys relations with France 81
The main interest of Gregory VII's Papacy is concentrated on the
great struggle with the Empire and the theories and claims that arose
out
of it. If his relations with the other countries of Europe are of minor
interest, thev are of almost equal importance in completing our
understanding of the Pope. He was dealing with similar problems, and he
applied the same methods to their solution; the enforcement of his
decrees, the recognition of his supreme authority in the ecclesiastical
department, co-operation with the secular authority, are his principal
objects. Conditions differed widely in each country; he was keenly alive
to these differences, shrewd and practical in varying his policy to suit
them. He had frequently to face opposition, but in no case was he
driven into open conflict with the secular authority. This must be boine
in mind in considering the claims which he advanced against the Empire,
which were the result of his conflict with the temporal ruler; where no
such conflict occurred, these claims did not emerge. Evidently then they
must not be taken to represent his normal attitude; they denote
rather the extreme position into which he was forced by determined
opposition.
Gregory had himself been employed as Papal legate to enforce the
reform decrees in France, and had thus been able to familiarise himself
with
the ecclesiastical situation.
The king, Philip I, had little real authority
in temporal matters, but exercised considerable influence in
ecclesiastical,
as also did the leading noblest The alliance of monarchy and episcopate,
a legacy to the Capetians from the Carolingians, was of impoi'tance to
the
king, both politically and financially. The rights of regalia and
spolia,
and the simoniacal appointments to bishoprics, provided an important
source of revenue, which the king would not willingly surrender; he
was therefore definitely antagonistic to the reform movement. The
simoniacal practices of the king and his plundering of Church property
naturally provoked Papal intervention. Remonstrance and warning were
of no effect, until at the Lenten Synod of 1075 a decree was passed
threatening Philip with excommunication if he failed to give
satisfaction
to the papal legates. The threat was apparently sufficient. Philip was
not strong enough openly to defy the Pope and risk excommunication.
Co-operation of the kind that Gregory desired was impossible, but
Philip was content with a defensive attitude, which hindered the
progress
of the Papal movement but did not finally prevent it. At any rate there
is no further reference to papal action against the king, who seems to
have
made a show of compliance with the Pope's wishes in 1080, when Gregory
wrote to him, imputing his former moral and ecclesiastical offences to
youthful folly and sending him precepts for his future conduct. The
^ In France, unlike Germany, the lay control complained of was exercised as much by the nobles as by the king. Gregory, who knew the local conditions, recognised that it was often not the king but a noble, such as the Count of Flanders, whose influence had to be counteracted.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. II. 6
82 Relations with France
episcopate adopted an attitude similar to that of the king. The lay
influence at elections, the prevalence of simony and of clerical marriage,
had created an atmosphere which made the work of reform peculiarly
difficult. The bishops, supporting and supported by the king, were
extremely averse to papal control, but owing to the strength of the
feudal nobility they lacked the territorial power and independence of the
German bishops. They had to be content therefore, like the king, with a
shifty and defensive attitude; they resisted continually, but only half-
heartedly.
In Gregory VII's correspondence with the French Church there are
two striking features. In the first place his letters to France are, at
every
stage of his papacy, more than twice as numerous as his letters to
Germany. These letters reveal the laxity prevailing in the Church, and
the
general disorder of the country owing to the weakness of the central
government; they also shew the timidity of the opposition which made it
possible for the Pope to interfere directly, not only in matters
affecting the
ecclesiastical organisation as a whole but also in questions of detail
concerning individual churches and monasteries. Secondly, while the
Pope"'s
correspondence with Germany was mainly concerned with the great
questions of his reform policy, his far more numerous letters to France
have hardly any references to these questions. His methods were the
same in both countries: in 1074 he sent Papal legates to France, as to
Germany, to inaugurate a great campaign against simony and clerical
marriage. The legates in Germany had met with determined resistance,
but those in France had pursued their work with such ardour and success
that the Pope established them eventually as permanent legates in France
— Bishop Hugh of Die being mainly concerned with the north and
centre, Bishop Amatus of Oloron with Aquitaine and Languedoc. To
them he left the task of enforcing compliance with the Papal decrees;
hence
the silence on these matters in his own correspondence. The legates,
especially Bishop Hugh, were indefatigable. They held numerous synods^,
publishing the Papal decrees and asserting their own authority.
Inevitably they provoked opposition, especially from the lower clergy to
the
enforcement of clerical celibacy, and their lives were sometimes in
danger;
at the Council of Poitiers in 1078 there was even a popular riot against
them. The archbishops were naturally reluctant to submit to their
authority, but had to be content with a passive resistance. They refused
to appear at the synods, or questioned the legatine authority. The sen-
tence of interdict, which Hugh never failed to employ, usually brought
them to a reluctant submission. Only Manasse, Archbishop of Rheims, for
whose character no writer has a good word, took a decided stand. He
refused to appear at the synods when summoned, and appealed against
the Pope*'s action in giving full legatine authority to non-Romans. As
he
* Hugh of Flaviguy (MGH, Script, viii, pp. 412 sqq.) gives au account of several
of these synods.
Relations with England 83
continued obstinate in his refusal to appear before the legates, he was
deposed in 1080 and a successor appointed in his place; not even the
king's support availed to save him. The action of the Papal legates was
often violent and ill-considei'ed. Hugh in particular was a man of rigid
and narrow outlook whose sentences never erred on the side of leniency.
The Pope repeatedly reminded him of the virtues of mercy and discretion,
and frequently reversed his sentences. The legate was aggrieved at the
Pope's leniency. He complained bitterly that his authority was not being
upheld by the Pope; offenders had only to run to Rome to obtain
immediate pardon. In the Pope's mind, however, submission to Rome
outweighed all else; when that was obtained, he readily dispensed with
the penalties of his subordinates. An important step towards the
strengthening of the Papal authority was taken in 1079, when he made the
Archbishop of Lyons primate of the four provinces of Lyons, Rouen,
Tours,
and Sens, subject of course to the immediate control of the Papacy; and
in 1082 the legate Hugh was, practically by the Pope's orders, promoted
Archbishop of Lyons.
The Pope, in his decree, spoke of the restoration
of the ancient constitution, but the Archbishop of Sens had bv custom
held the primacy, and Lyons was now rather imperial than French in its
allegiance. A consideration of this nature was not likely to weigh with
the Pope; it was against the idea of national and independent churches,
which monarchical control was tending to produce, that he was directing
his efforts. If he was not able definitely to prevent lav control of elections
in France, he had firmly established papal authority over the French
Church. If his decrees were not carefully obeyed, the principles of the
reform movement were accepted; in the critical yeare that followed his
death, France was to provide many of the chief supporters of the Papal
policy.
The situation with regard to England was altogether different.
Gregory's friendship with King William I was of long standing. His had
been the influence that had induced Alexander II to give the papal
blessing to the Norman Duke's conquest of England. William had
recognised the obligation and made use of his friendship. On Gregory's
accession he wrote expressing his keen satisfaction at the event. William
was a ruler of the type of the Emperor Henry III. Determined to be
master in Church and State alike, he was resolved to establish good order
and justice in ecclesiastical as well as in secular affairs. He was therefore
in sympathy with Church reform and the purity of Church discipline and
government. He was fortunate in his Archbishop of Canterbury, Lanfranc,
whose legal mind shared the same vision of royal autocracy; content
to be subject to the king he would admit no ecclesiastical equal, and
successfully upheld the primacy of his see against the independent claims
of York. The personnel of the episcopate, secularised and ignorant,
needed drastic alteration; William was careful to refrain from simony
and to make good appointments, but he was equally careful to keep the
CH. II. 6 2
84 Relations with England
appointments in his own hands. He took a strong line against the
immorality and ignorance of the lower clergy, and promoted reform by
the encouragement he gave to regulars. Frequent Church councils were
held, notably at Winchester in 1076, where decrees were passed against
clerical marriage, simony, and the holding of tithes by laymen ; but the
decrees were framed by the king, and none could be published without his
sanction. The work of Church reform was furthered, as Gregory wished,
by the active co-operation of the king; the separation of the
ecclesiastical
from the civil courts, creating independent Church government, was also
a measure after Gregory's heart. The Pope frequently expressed his
gratification ; the work of purifying the Church, so much impeded else-
where, was proceeding apace in England without the need of his
intervention. Disagreement arose from William's determination to be
master in
his kingdom, in ecclesiastical affairs as well as in secular; he made
this
clear by forbidding Papal bulls to be published without his permission,
and especially by refusing to allow English bishops to go to Rome.
The
Pope bitterly resented the king's attitude; a novel and formidable
obstacle
confronted him in the one quarter where he had anticipated none.
Matters were not improved by the papal decree of 1079, subjecting the
Norman archbishopric of Rouen to the primacy of the Archbishop of
Lyons. So for a time relations were much strained, but an embassy from
William in 1080 seems to have restored a better understanding, and even
to have encouraged Gregory to advance the striking claim that William
should do fealty to the Papacy for his kingdom. There is good reason to
believe that the claim was made in 1080, and that it took the form of a
message entrusted to the legate Hubert with the letter he brought to
William in May 1080^. The king abruptly dismissed the claim on the
ground that there was no precedent to justify it. The Pope yielded to
this rebuff and made no further attempt, nor did William's refusal
interfere with the restored harmony. Gregory was sensible, as he wrote
in
1081, of the many exceptional merits in William, who moreover had
refused to listen to the overtures of the Pope's enemies. And in one
respect
William made a concession. He allowed Lanfranc to visit Rome at the
end of 1082, the first visit that is recorded of any English bishop
during
Gregory's papacy^. It was only a small concession. For, while the reform
movement was directly furthered by royal authority in England, the
Church remained quasi-national under royal control ; the introduction of
Papal authority was definitely resisted.
In the remaining parts of Europe the Pope's efforts were mainly
directed towards three objects — missionary work, uniformity of ritual, and
the extension of the temporal power of the Papacy. With backward
1 Cf. EIIR, XXVI, pp. 225 sqq.
2 Ordericus Vitalis says that Lanfranc went to Rome in 1076. The statements in
Gregory's letters, Reg. vi, 30 (1079) and vin, 43 (1082), are sufficient contradiction
of this.
Relations with other states 85
countries such as Norway and Sweden, where the difficulty of the language
was an obstacle to the sending of Roman missionaries, he urged that
young men should be sent to Rome for instruction, so that they mighl:
return to impart it to their fellow-countrymen. In Poland it was the
undeveloped ecclesiastical organisation that called for his attention; it
possessed no metropolitan and hardly any bishops, and he sent legates to
introduce the necessary reforms. The question of uniformity of ritual
arose with regard to the territory recently recovered to Christianity from
the Saracens, especially in Spain. The acceptance by the Spanish Church
of the Ordo Romanus was an event of great importance for Catholicism in
the future. Over Spain, and on the same grounds over Corsica and Sardinia
as well, the Pope claimed authority temporal as well as spiritual. They
were all, he declared, in former times under the jurisdiction of St Peter,
but the rights of the Papacy had long been in abeyance owing to the
negligence of his predecessor or the usurpation of the Saracens. Though
he does not state the ground for his assertion, it is doubtless the (forged)
Donation of Constantine to Pope Sylvester I that he had in his mind^
He was more precise in his claims over Hungary. St Stephen had handed
over his kingdom to St Peter, as the Emperor Henry III recognised after
his victory over Hungary, when he sent a lance and crown to St Peter.
King Salomo, despising St Peter, had received his kingdom as a fief
from King Henry IV; later he had been expelled by his cousin Geza.
This was God's judgment for his impiety. In these cases Gregory was
trying to establish claims based on former grants.
He was equally anxious
to extend Papal dominion by new grants. He readily acceded to the
request of Dmitri that the kingdom of Russia might be taken under Papal
protection and held as a fief from the Papacy ; the King of Denmark had
made a similar suggestion to his predecessor, which Gregory tried to
persuade the next king to confirm.
His positive success in this policy was slight. The interest lies rather in the fact that he rested all these claims on grants from secular rulers ; in no case does he assert that the ruler should do fealty to him in virtue of the overlordship of the spiritual power over all earthly rulers. This was a claim he applied to the Empire alone, his final remedy to cure the sickness of the world, and to prevent a recurrence of the great conflict in which he was engaged. He seems to have been loth to resort to this remedy until open defiance drove him to its use. It is not unlikely, however, that he did contemplate the gradual extension over Western Christendom of papal overlordship; but he conceived of this overlordship as coming into being in the normal feudal manner, established by consent and on a constitutional basis. In this way, when he could compel obedience even from temporal rulers to the dictates of the moral law, his dream of the rule of righteousness would at last be fulfilled.
^ Urban II in 1091 directly quotes Coustautine's Donation as the scarce of the
authority he claims over Corsica and Lipara.
86 Pope Victor III
II.
Gregory VII was dead, but his personality continued to dominate the
Church, his spirit lived on in the enthusiasm of his followers. The great
pamphlet-warfare, already in existence, became fuller and more bitter
over his final claims against the Empire. But his immediate successors
were concerned with the practical danger that threatened the Papacy.
They had to fight not for its supremacy so much as for the continued exis-
tence of its independence, once more threatened with imperial control.
With Henry, endeavouring to establish a Pope amenable to his wishes,
there could be no accommodation. Until his death in 1106 everything had
to be subordinated to the immediate necessities of a struggle for existence.
But in the rest of Europe the situation is entirely different. Nowhere was
Henry's candidate recognised as Pope, and outside imperial territory the
extreme claims of Gregory VII had not been put forward. In these
countries, therefore, the policy of Gregory VII was continued and de-
veloped, and, considering the extent to which the Papacy was hampered
by its continual struggle with the Emperor, the advance it was able to
make was remarkable, and not without effect on its attitude to the Empire
when communion was restored on the succession of Henry V to the throne.
When Gregory VII died, in exile and almost in captivity, the position
of his supporters was embarrassing in the extreme, and it was not until
a year had passed that a successor to him was elected. Nor was the
election of Abbot Desiderius of Monte Cassino as Pope Victor III of
hopeful augury for the future. Desiderius was above all things a peace-
maker, inclined thereto alike by temperament and by the position of
his abbey, which lay in such dangerous proximity to the encroaching
Normans. He had acted as peace-maker between Robert Guiscard and
Richard of Capua in 1075, and thereby assisted in thwarting the policy
of Gregory VII; in 1080 he had made amends by effecting the alliance
of Gregory with Robert Guiscard at Ceprano. But in 1 082 he had even
entered into peace negotiations with Henry IV and assisted the alliance
of the latter with Jordan of Capua; hence for a year he was under the
papal ban. Possibly his election was a sign that the moderate party,
anxious for peace, had won the ascendency. More probably it indicates
the continued dominance of Norman influence. Robert Guiscard, indeed,
had died shortly after Gregory VII, but his sons Roger and Bohemond
in South Italy and his brother Roger in Sicily continued his policy,
affording the papal party their protection and in return enforcing their
will. And for this purpose Desiderius was an easy tool.
The unfortunate
Pope knew himself to be unequal to the crisis, and made repeated attempts
to resign the office he had so little coveted. It was, therefore, a cruel
addition to his misfortunes that he was violently attacked by the more
extreme followers of Gregory VII, especially by the Papal legates in
Election of Pope Urban II 87
France and Spain, Archbishop Hugh of Lyons and Abbot Richard of
Marseilles, who accused him of inordinate ambition and an unworthy use
of Norman assistance to obtain his election. Perhaps it was this
opposition that stiffened his resolution and decided him at last in
March 1087
at Capua, fortified by Norman support, to undertake the duties of his
office. He went to Rome, and on 9 May was consecrated in St Peter's by
the cardinal-bishops, whose action was in itself an answer to his
traducers.
But his reign was to be of short duration. Unable to maintain himself
in Rome, he soon retired to Monte Cassino, his real home, where he died
on 16 September. The only noteworthy act of his Papacy was the holding
of a synod at Benevento in August, at which he issued a decree against
lay investiture, passed sentence of anathema on the anti-Pope, and
excommunicated Archbishop Hugh and Abbot Richard for the charges they
had presumed to bring against him.
For six months the Papal throne was again vacant. At last, on
12 March 1088, the cardinals met at Terracina, and unanimously elected
Otto, Cardinal-bishop of Ostia, as Pope Urban II. The three vears of
weakness and confusion were at an end, and a worthy leader had been
found. On the day following his election he wrote a letter to his
supporters in Germany, stating his determination to follow in the steps
of
Gregory VII, and affirming solemnly his complete adhesion to all the
acts
and aspirations of his dead master. To this declaration he consistently
adhered; it was in fact the guiding principle of his policy. Yet in
other
respects he presents a complete antithesis to Gregory VII. He was a
Frenchman of noble parentage, born (about 1042) near Rheims, educated
at the cathedral school, and rising rapidly in ecclesiastical rank.
Suddenly
he abandoned these prospects and adopted the monastic profession at
Cluny, where about 1076 he was appointed prior.
Some two years later,
the Abbot Hugh was requested by Pope Gregory VII to send some of his
monks to work under him at Rome. Otto was one of those selected, and
he was made Cardinal-bishop of Ostia in 1078. From this time he seems
to have been attached to the person of the Pope as a confidential adviser,
and he was occasionally employed on important missions. He was taken
prisoner by Henry IV when on his way to the November synod of 1083.
Released the next year, he went as legate to Germany, where he worked
untiringly to strengthen the Papal party. In 1085 he was present at a
conference for peace between the Saxons and Henry's supportei-s and, after
the failure of this conference, at the Synod of Quedlinburg, where the
excommunication of Henry, Guibert, and their supporters was again
promulgated. On the death of Gregory VII he returned to Italy, and
was the candidate of a section of the Curia to succeed Gregory, who had
indeed mentioned his name on his death-bed. He loyally supported
Victor III, and in 1088 was unanimously elected to succeed him. Tall
and handsome, eloquent and learned, his personality was as different from
that of Gregory VII as his early career had been. In his case it was the
88 Extension of the work of Gregory VII
gentleness and moderation of his nature that won admiration; we are told
that he refused at the price of men's lives even to recover Rome. His
learning, especially his training in Canon Law, was exactly what was
required in the successor of Gregory VII. He was well qualified to work
out in practice the principles of Church government inherited from his
predecessor, and to place the reconstructed Church on a sound constitutional basis.
The continual struggle with the Empire, which outlasted
his life, robbed him of the opportunity, though much that he did was to
be of permanent effect. It was in his native country, France, that his
talents were to be employed with the greatest success.
It is mainly in connexion with France, therefore, that we can trace
his general ideas of Church government, his view of papal authority and
its relations with the lay power. There is no divergence from the
stand-point of Gregory VII; he was content to carry on the work of his
predecessor, following the same methods and with the same objects in
view.
Papal control was maintained by the system of permanent legates, and
Urban continued to employ Archbishop Hugh of Lyons, and Amatus
who now became Archbishop of Bordeaux. The former he had pardoned
for his transgression against Victor III and he had confirmed him as
legate.
Hugh's fellow-offender. Abbot Richard of Marseilles, was also pardoned
and was soon promoted to the archbishopric of Narbonne. But he was
not employed again as legate in Spain ; this function was attached to
the
archbishopric of Toledo.
Germany too was now given a permanent legate
in the person of Bishop Gebhard of Constance. These legates were em-
powered to act with full authority on the Pope's behalf, were kept informed
of his wishes, and were made responsible for promoting the papal
policy.
Urban's ultimate object was undoubtedly the emancipation of the
Church from the lay control that was responsible for its secularisation
and loss of spiritual ideals. He had to combat the idea inherent in feudal
society that churches, bishoprics, and abbeys were in the private gift of
the lord in whose territory they were situated. To this he opposed the
Papal view that the laity had the duty of protecting the Church but no
right of possession or authority over it. Free election by clergy and people
had been the programme of the reform party for half a century, and even
more than Gregory VII did Urban II pay attention to the circumstances
attending appointments to bishoprics and abbeys. At several synods he
repeated decrees against lay investiture, and forbade the receiving of any
ecclesiastical dignity or benefice from a layman. At the Council of
Clermont in 1095 he went further, prohibiting a bishop or priest from
doing homage to a layman. According to Bishop Ivo of Chartres, Urban
recognised the right of the king to take part in elections "as head of the
people," that is to say the right of giving, but not of refusing, assent. He
also allowed the king's right to "concede" the regalia — the temporal
possessions of the see that had come to it by royal grant; here again
The organisation of the Church 89
the right of refusing "concession" is not implied. Ivo of Chartres was
prepared to allow the king a much larger part in elections than the Pope
conceded, and his interpretation of Urban's decrees is, from the point of
view of the king, the most favourable that could be put upon them.
The Pope was undoubtedly advancing in theory towards a condition of
complete independence, but his decrees are rather an expression of his
ideal than of his practice.
In practice he was, like Gregory VII, much more moderate, and when
good appointments were made was not disposed to quarrel with lay
influence. His temperament, as well as the political situation, deterred
him from drastic action, for instance, in dealing with the Kings of England
and France. He tried every means of persuasion before issuing a decree
of excommunication against Philip I in the matter of his divorce; and
though he took Anselm under his protection, he never actually pronounced
sentence against William II. It was a difficult position to maintain.
His legates, especially the violent Hugh, followed the exact letter of the
decrees, and by their ready use of the penal clauses often caused embarrassment to the Pope.
On the other hand, the bishops and secular clergy,
as was shewn in France over the royal divorce question, were too
complaisant to the king and could not be trusted. On the regular clergy
he
could place more reliance, and it is to them that he particularly looked
for support. It is remarkable how large a proportion of the documents
that issued from Urban's Chancery were bulls to monasteries,
confirming their privileges and possessions, exempting them sometimes
from episcopal control, and taking them under Papal protection (always
with the proviso that they shall pay an annual census to the papal
treasury); the extension of Cluniac influence with Urban's approval
naturally had the same effect. Nor was his interest confined to
Benedictine
monasteries; he gave a ready encouragement to the new orders in process
of formation, especially to the regular canons who traced their rule to
St Augustine. And so, at the same time that he was trying to secure for
the bishops freedom of election and a loosening of the yoke that bound
them to the lay power, he was narrowing the range of their spiritual
authority. Indirectly too the authority of the metropolitans was
diminishing; it was becoming common for bishops to obtain confirmation
of their election from the Pope, and in some cases consecration as well,
while the practice of direct appeal to Rome was now firmly established.
Moreover, the appointment of primates, exalting some archbishops at the
expense of others, introduced a further grading into the hierarchy, and
at the same time established responsibility for the enforcement of papal
decrees. The primacy of Lyons, created by Gregory VII, was confirmed
by Urban in spite of the protests of Archbishop Richer of Sens, who
refused to recognise the authority of Lyons; his successor Daimbert was
for a time equally obstinate, but had to submit in order to obtain
consecration. Urban extended the system by creating the Archbishop of
Rheims
90 Reduction of Papal claims to Temporal Authority
primate of Belgica Secunda^, the Archbishop of Narbonne primate over
Aix, and the Archbishop of Toledo primate of all Spain. The Pope,
therefore, was modelling the ecclesiastical constitution so as to make his
authority effective throughout. A natural consequence of this was his
zeal for uniformity. He was anxious, as he had been as legate, to get rid
of local customs and to produce a universal conformity to the practice
of the Roman Church. This is evident in many of his decretals, those,
for instance, that regulated ordinations and ecclesiastical promotions or
that prescribed the dates of the fasts quattuor temporum.
While Urban II undoubtedly increased the spiritual authority of the
Papacy, he was far less concerned than Gregory VII with its temporal
authority. He certainly made use of the Donation of Constantine to assert
his authority in Corsica and Lipara, but he did not revive Gregory VII's
claims to Hungary, nor did he demand from England anything more than
the payment of Peter's Pence. It was not until 1095 that he received the
recognition of William II, and his mild treatment of that king, in spite
of William's brutality to Archbishop Anselm, has already been mentioned.
In Spain and Sicily he was mainly concerned with the congenial task of
re-creating bishoprics and rebuilding monasteries in the districts recently
won from the infidel; he was careful to make papal authority effective,
and to introduce uniformity to Roman practice by the elimination of
local uses. One great extension of temporal authority he did not disdain.
In 1095 King Peter of Aragon, in return for the payment of an annual
tribute, obtained the protection of the Holy See, and acknowledged his
subordination to its authority. Papal overlordship was recognised also by
the Normans in South Italy, and Roger, Robert Guiscard's son, was
invested by Urban with the duchy of Apulja. The Normans, however,
were vassals only in name, and never allowed their piety to interfere with
their interests. In 1098 Urban was a helpless witness of the siege and
capture of Capua, and the same year Count Roger of Sicily obtained for
himself and his heirs a remarkable privilege. No papal legate, unless sent
a latere, was to enter his territory. The count himself was to hold the
position of papal legate, and, in the case of a papal summons to a Roman
Council, was allowed to decide which of his bishops and abbots should go
and which should remain. Urban owed much to Norman protection, but
he had to pay the price..
At any rate, at the time of his accession. Urban was safe only in Norman territory. Guibert held Rome, and Urban's adherents in the city were few and powerless. Countess Matilda was loyal as ever, but all her resources were needed for her own security. Lombardy was still strongly anti-papal, while in Germany (apart from Saxony) there were hardly half-a-dozen bishops who upheld the papal cause, and the rebel nobles were absorbed in their own defence. But in North Italy the tide soon
* The old Roman province.
This gave the archbishop the title of primate ^ but
nothing more.
Papal victory in North Italy 91
began to turn. Already in 1088 the Archbishop of Milan had renounced
allegiance to Henrv and had become reconciled with the Pope, who
pardoned his offence of having received royal investiture. There
followed in
1089 the marriage of the younger Welf with the ageing Countess Matilda
of Tuscany, truly (as the chroniclers relate) not prompted by any
weakness of the flesh, but a political move which reflected little
credit on either
party; the Duke of Bavaria, at any rate, was completely outwitted, but
the Papacy gained the immediate help it required. It brought Henry into
Itah- to wage a campaign that was for two years successful, culminating
in
the capture of Mantua, and a signal victory over Matilda's troops at
Tricontai, in 1091, but he was now fighting to maintain his authority
in Lombardy, where it had prenouslv been unchallenged. The final blow
came with the revolt of his son Conrad in 1093. Conrad, bringing with
him stories of fresh crimes to blacken his father''s name, was welcomed
by the papal party with open arms, and crowned (he had already been
crowned King of Germany) with the iron crown of Lombardy. A regular
Lombard League sprang into being with Milan at its head. The unfortunate
father was in very evil plight, almost isolated at Verona,
miable, as his enemies held the passes, even to escape into Germany
until
1097.
Success in North Italy reacted on Urban's authority elsewhere. The
winter of 1088-1089 he had indeed spent in Rome, but in wretched
circumstances, living on the island in the Tiber under the direction of
the
Pierleoni, and obtaining the necessities of life from the charity of a
few
poor women. Later in 1089 the expulsion of Guibert from Rome improved
the Pope's position, but it was only a temporary improvement. The
hostile element (probably the recollection of 1084 was still smarting)
was
too strong for him, and he had to retire south in the summer of 1090.
Though he managed to celebrate Christmas both in 1091 and 1092 in
the suburbs, he was not able to enter the city again until Christmas
1093.
Refusing to allow bloodshed to secure his position, he adopted the safer
method of winning the Romans by gold, instituting collections for this
purpose, especially in France. In 1094 Abbot Geoffrey of Vendome, on
a visit to the Pope, found him living in mean state in the house of John
Frangipani, and supplied him with money with which he purchased the
Lateran from a certain Ferruchius left in charge of it by Guibert. From
this time Urban's fortunes began to mend, and only the castle of Sant
Angelo remained in the hands of the Guibertines. But his tenure ot
Rome was insecure ; papal authority within the city was not popular,
while outside his enemies made the approaches dangerous for those who
came to visit the Pope. It was not surprising, then, that he took the
opportunity of the succe.ss of his cause in North Italy to commence the
northern tour which was to have such important results.
In Germany progress was made with difficulty. The bishops as a
whole were too deeply implicated in the schism to withdraw, and the
92 Little headway in Germany
Papal legate, Bishop Gebhard of Constance, in spite of his undoubted
zeal, could make little headway. The deaths of Bishops Herman of
Metz and Adalbero of Wiirzburg in 1090, and of Abbot William of
Hirschau and Bishop Altmann of Passau in 1091, robbed the papal
party of its staunchest supporters.
But Henry's absence in Italy and the
revolt of Conrad gave an opportunity to the two sections of opposition
to
Henry in South Germany to unite for concerted action. At an assembly
held at Ulm in 1093 all present pledged themselves by oath to accept
Bishop Gebhard as the spiritual head, and his brother Duke Berthold as
the temporal leader, of the party ; further, Dukes Berthold and Welf did
homage as vassals to the Papal legate and thus recognised the
overlordship of the Pope. At the same time, the leading bishops in
Lorraine
renounced obedience to the excommunicated Archbishop of Treves and
brought a welcome reinforcement to the Papal party. The improvement
in the situation is shewn by the largely-attended synod presided over by
Gebhard at Constance in the following Lent. Shortly afterwards Europe
was devastated by a pestilence, which was particularly severe in
Germany.
The fear of death had a considerable effect in withdrawing adherents
from an excommunicated king, and the increasing sentiment in favour of
the lawful Pope was heightened by the commencement of the crusading
movement. The political situation, however, was less satisfactory than
the ecclesiastical.
Duke Welf, foiled in his expectations of the results of
his son's marriage with Matilda, reverted to Henry's allegiance in 1095,
and Henry's return to Germany in 1097 prevented the revolt against him
from assuming greater proportions.
The reconciliation with the Church of so many that had been in
schism before made it urgently necessary to find an answer to the
question — in what light were to be regarded the orders of those who
received ordination from schismatics or simonists.'^ Ever since the war on
simony began, the question of ordinations by simonists had agitated
the Church. Peter Damian had argued for their validity. Cardinal
Humbert had been emphatic against, and Popes Nicholas II and
Gregory VII had practically adopted his opinion. On one thing all alike
were agreed — there could be no such thing as reordination. In Hum-
bert's view, simonists were outside the pale of the Church, and could
confer nothing sacramental ; those who received ordination from them in
effect received nothing, and so, unless they afterwards received Catholic or-
dination, they had no orders at all. Urban was obviously at a loss for some
time, and his rulings were of a contradictory nature. He uses the
language of Humbert when he says in 1089 that he himself ordained
Daimbert, Bishop-elect of Pisa, as deacon, because Daimbert had
previously been ordained by Archbishop Werner of Mayence, heretic and
excommunicate, and "qui nihil habuit, nil dare potuit"; and again in
1091 when he ruled that Poppo, Bishop-elect of Metz, must be ordained
deacon by a Catholic bishop if his previous ordination had been simoniacal,
The question of schismatic ordinations 93
because in that case it would be null.1 But circumstances were too
strong
for him, and even in 1089 he gave permission to his legate in Germany
to allow the retention of their ordei-s to those who without simony had
received ordination from schismatic bishops, provided the latter had
themselves received Catholic ordination. It was at the great Council of
Piacenza in 1095 that he at last issued authoritative decrees on this
subject. Those ordained by schismatic bishops, who had themselves
received Catholic ordination, might retain their orders, if and when
they
returned to the unity of the Church. Also those who had been ordained
by schismatics or simonists might retain their orders if they could
prove
their ignorance of the excommunication or simony of their ordainers.
But in all cases where such ignorance was not alleged the orders were
declared to be altogether of no effect (omnino irritae). Tlie meaning of
this is not clear, but evidently the validity of such orders is in fact
recognised, as the validity of the sacrament could not depend on the
knowledge
or ignorance of the ordinand. Some light is thrown by a letter of
uncertain
date to one Lucius, provost of St Juventius. After having declared
the validity of the orders and sacraments of criminous clergy, provided
they are not schismatics, he goes on to say that the schismatics have
the
forma but not the virtutis effectus of the sacraments, unless and until
they
are received into the Catholic communion by the laying-on of hands.
This then was the bridge by which the penitent schismatic might pass into
the Catholic fold, and the ceremony of reconciliation, which included
the performance of all the rites of ordination save that of unction, was
laid down by him in letters wTitten both in 1088 and 1097. Urban's
position was neither easy to comprehend nor to maintain, and the anti-
Pope Guibert was on firmer ground when he condemned those who
refused to recognise the ordinations of his partisans. Urban's successor was
able, when the death of Henry IV brought the schism to an end, to
assist the restoration of unity by a more generous policy of recognition.
As we have seen, in 1094, when the Pope was at last in possession of
the Lateran palace, his cause was victorious throughout Italy and
gaining
adherents rapidly in Germany. In the autumn he left Rome and commenced
his journey, which lasted two years and was not far short of a
triumphal progress, through France and Italy. He came first to Tuscany
^ Here in particular I disagree from the interpretation of Urban's attitude given
by the Abbe Saltet (Les Reordinations , pp. 222 sqq.). He uses these two instances as
evidence that, in the case of deacons as distinct from priests, etc., Urban insisted on
an entirely new ordination. But the reasons given by the Pope for his decisions in
these two cases liave a general application and are not influenced by the fact that he
is dealing with ordinations to the diacouate only.
Clearly none of their orders are
valid. Though on various points I cannot accept the Abbe's conclusions, it is only
fair to add that, but for the illumination that he has thrown upon this most involved
subject, it would have been difficult to lind one's way at all.
94 Urban's progress through North Italy and France
where he spent the winter, and then proceeded into North Italy which had
been persistent, under the lead of the bishops, in its hostility to the Pope,
and which, now that the episcopal domination was beginning to wane,
was looking to the Pope as an ally against imperial authority. Even the
bishops, following the example of the Archbishop of Milan, were rapidly
becoming reconciled with the Pope. In March 1095 Urban held a Council
at Piacenza, which was attended by an immense concourse of ecclesiastics
and laymen. The business, some of which has already been mentioned,
was as important as the attendance. Praxedis, Henry IVs second wife,
was present to shock the assembly with stories of the horrors her husband
had forced her to commit. These found a ready credence, and she herself
a full pardon and the Pope's protection. The case of King Philip of
France, excommunicated for adultery by Archbishop Hugh at Autun
the previous year, was debated and postponed for the Pope's decision in
France. Finally there appeared the envoys of the Emperor Alexius im-
ploring the help of Western Christendom against the infidel, and the
inspiration came to Urban that was to give a great purpose to his journey
to France.
From Piacenza Urban passed to Cremona, where he met
Conrad, who did fealty to him and received in return the promise of im-
perial coronation. Conrad further linked himself with the papal cause by
marrying the daughter of Count Roger of Sicily shortly afterwards at
Pisa. It is easy to blame the Pope who welcomed the rebel son ; but it
is
juster to attribute his welcome as given to the penitent seeking
absolution
and a refuge from an evil and excommunicated father. The fault of
Urban was rather that he took up the unfortunate legacy from Gregory VII
of attempting to establish an Emperor who would be his vassal, falling
thus into the temptation that was to be fatal to the Papacy. Urban in
this respect was as unsuccessful as his rival, who attempted to
establish a
compliant Pope ; Conrad lived on for six more years, but without a
following, and he and Guibert alike came to their end discredited and
alone.
In July the Pope entered France, where judgment was to be passed on the king and the Crusade to be proclaimed. But the Pope's energies were not confined to these two dominant questions. He travelled ceaselessly from place to place, looking into every detail of the ecclesiastical organisation, settling disputes, and consecrating churches. Philip I made no attempt to interfere with the Papal progress, and the people everywhere hailed with enthusiasm and devotion the unaccustomed sight of a Pope. The climax was reached at the Council of Clermont in the latter half of November, where both of the important questions were decided. The king was excommunicated and the First Crusade proclaimed. Urban recognised that he was again following in the footsteps of Gregory VII, but his was the higher conception and his the practical ability that realised the ideal. A less disinterested Pope might have roused the enthusiasm of the faithful against his enemy in Germany; personal considerations
' Cf. infra, Chap, v, pp. 219 sq., 222 sq.
Urban's last years and death 95
might at least have checked him from sending the great host to fight
against the infidel when the Emperor still threatened danger, the King
of
France was alienated by excommmnication, and the King of England was
anything but friendly. His disinterestedness had its reward in the
position the Papacy secured in consequence of the success of his appeal,
but
this reward was not in Urban's mind in issuing the appeal. Clermont was
followed by no anti-climax. The papal progress was continued in 1096,
the Crusade was preached again at Angers and on the banks of the Loire,
synods were held at Tours and Nimes, and the popular enthusiasm
increased in intensity. He had the satisfaction too of obtaining the
submission of Philip.
When he returned to Italy in September, and, accompanied by
Countess ^Matilda, made his way to Rome, he was to experience even there
a great reception and to feel himself at last master of the papal city.
"Honeste tute et alacriter sumus"" are the concluding words of his
account of his return in a letter to Archbishop Hugh of Lyons. And in
1098 the last stronghold of the Guibertines, the castle of Sanf Angelo,
fell into his hands. But his joy was premature. It would seem that the
turbulent Roman nobles, who had tasted independence, were not willing
to submit for long to papal authority. It was not in the Lateran palace
but in the house of the Pierleoni that Urban died on 29 July 1099, and
his body was taken by way of Trastevere to its last resting place in the
Vatican.
But, on the whole, his last three years were passed in comparative tranquillity and honour.
The presence of Archbishop Anselm of Canterbury,
in exile from England, added distinction to the papal Court. Received
with the veneration that his character merited, Anselm acted as champion
of Western orthodoxy against the Greeks at the Council of Bari in 1098.
And three months before his death Urban held in St Peter's his last
council, at which the decrees of Piacenza and Clermont were solemnly
re-affirmed. Anselm returned to England with the decrees against lay
investiture and homage as the last memory of his Roman visit. They were
to bring him into immediate conflict with his new sovereign.
It was perhaps due to the unsettled state of Rome that the cardinals
chose San Clemente for the place of conclave; there on 13 August they
unanimously elected Rainer, cardinal-priest of that basilica, as Urban's
successor, in spite of his manifest reluctance. The anti-Pope was hovering
in the neighbourhood and a surprise from him was feared, but nothing
occurred to disturb the election. Rainer, who took the name of Paschal II,
was a Tuscan by birth, who had been from early days a monk and, like his
predecessor, at Cluny. Sent to Rome by the Abbot Hugh while still quite
young, he had been retained by Gregory YII and appointed Abbot of San
Lorenzo fuori le mura and afterwards cardinal-priest of San Clemente. By
Urban II, in whose election he took a leading part, he had been employed
96 Pope Paschal II
as Papal legate in Spain, Here our knowledge of his antecedents ceases.
So general was the agreement at his election that he was conducted at
once to take possession of the Lateran palace, and on the following day
was solemnly consecrated and enthroned at St Peter's. Guibert was
dangerously close, but the arrival of Norman gold enabled the Pope to
chase him from Albano to Sutri; soon afterwards he retired to Civita
Castellana, and died there in September 1100.
Two anti-Popes were set
up in succession by his Roman partisans, both cardinal-bishops of his
creation — Theodoric of Santa Rufina and Albert of the Sabina — but both
were easily disposed of. Paschal, so far fortunate, was soon to
experience
the same trouble as Urban II from the Roman nobles. The defeat of
Peter Colonna (with whom the name Colonna first enters into history) was
an easy matter. More dangerous were the Corsi, who, after being expelled
from their stronghold on the Capitol, settled in the Marittima and took
their revenge by plundering Papal territory. Closely connected with this
disturbance was the rising of other noble families under the lead of a
German, Marquess Werner of Ancona, which resulted in 1105 in the
setting-up of a third anti-Pope, the arch-priest Maginulf, who styled
himself Pope Sylvester IV. Paschal was for a time forced to take refuge
in the island on the Tiber, but the anti-Pope was soon expelled. He
remained, however, as a useful pawn for Henry V in his negotiations with
the Pope, until the events of 1111 did away with the need for him, and
he was then discarded. The nobles had not ceased to harass Paschal, and
a serious rising in 1108-1109 hampered him considerably at a time when
his relations with Henry were becoming critical. Again in 1116, on the
occasion of Henry's second appearance in Italy,
Paschal was forced to
leave Rome for a time owing to the riots that resulted from his attempt
to establish a Pierleone as prefect of the city.
The new Pope was of a peaceful and retiring disposition, and in his
attempts to resist election he shewed a just estimate of his own capacity.
Lacking the practical gifts of Urban II and Gregory VII, and still more
the enlightened imagination of the latter, he was drawn into a struggle
which he abhorred and for which he was quite unequal. Timid and
unfamiliar with the world, he dreaded the ferocia gentis of the Germans,
and commiserated with Anselm on being inter barbaros positus as arch-
bishop. He was an admirable subordinate in his habit of unquestioning
obedience, but he had not the capacity to lead or to initiate. Obedient
to his predecessors, he was obstinate in adhering to the text of their
decrees, but he was very easily overborne by determined opponents. This
weakness of character is strikingly demonstrated throughout the investi-
ture struggle, in which he took the line of rigid obedience to the text of
papal decrees. Probably he was not cognisant of all the complicated
constitutional issues involved, and the situation required the connnon
sense and understanding of a man like Bishop Ivo of Chartres to handle
it with success; Ivo had the true Gregorian standpoint. Paschal devised
His character 97
a solution of the difficulty with Henry V in 1111 which was admirable
on paper but impossible to carry into effect; and he shewed no strength
of mind when he had to face the storm which his scheme provoked.
A short captivity was sufficient to wring from him the concession of lay
investiture which his decrees had so emphatically condemned. When this
again raised a storm, he yielded at once and revoked his concession; at the
same time he refused to face the logic of his revocation and to stand up
definitely against the Emperor who had forced the concession from him.
The misery of his later years was the fruit of his indecision and lack of
courage. The electors are to blame, who overbore his resistance, and it is
impossible not to sympathise with this devout, well-meaning, but weak
Pope, faced on all sides by strong-minded men insistent that their extreme
demands must be earned out and contemptuous of the timid nature that
yielded so readily. Eadmer tells us of a characteristic outburst from
William Rufus, on being informed that the new Pope was not unlike
Anselm in character: "God's Face! Then he isn't much good,"
The
comparison has some truth in it, though it is a little unfair to Anselm.
Both were unworldly men, drawn against their will from their monasteries
to a prolonged contest with powerful sovereigns; unquestioning obedience
to spiritual authority was characteristic of them both, but immeasurably
the greater was Anselm, who spoke no ill of his enemies and shielded
them from punishment, while he never yielded his principles even to
extreme
violence. Paschal would have left a great name behind him, had he been
possessed of the serene courage of St Anselm.
For seven years the tide flowed strongly in his favour. The death of
the anti-Pope Guibert in 1100 was a great event. It seems very probable
that if Henry IV had discarded Guibert, as Henry V discarded Maginulf,
he might have come to terms with Urban II. But Henry IV' was more
loyal to his allies than was his son, and he refused to take this
treacherous
step. It seemed to him that with Guiberfs death the chief difficulty was
removed, and he certainly gave no countenance to the anti-Popes of a day
that were set up in Rome to oppose Paschal. He was indeed quite ready
to recognise Paschal, and, in consonance with the universal desire in
Germany for the healing of the schism, announced his intention of going
to Rome in pei-son to be present at a synod where issues between Empire
and Papacy might be amicably settled. It was Paschal, however, who
proved
irreconcilable. In his letters and decrees he shewed his firm resolve to
give
no mercy to the king who had been excommunicated and deposed by his
predecessors and by himself. Henry was a broken man, very different
from the antagonist of Gregory VII, and it was easy for Paschal to be
defiant. The final blow for the Emperor came at Christmas 1104, when
the young Henry deserted him and joined the rebels. Relying on the
nobles and the papal partisans, Henry V was naturally anxious to be
reconciled with the Pope. Paschal welcomed the rebel with open arms, as
Urban had welcomed Conrad.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. II.
98 The end of the schism
The formal reconciliation took place at the beginning of 1106. Born
in 1081, when his father was already excommunicated, Henry could only
have received baptism from a schismatic bishop. With the ceremony of
the laying-on of hands he was received by Catholic bishops into the
Church, and by this bridge the mass of the schismatics passed back into
the orthodox fold. The Pope made easy the path of reconciliation, and
the schism was thus practically brought to an end. The young king, as
his position was still insecure, shewed himself extremely compliant to
the
Church party. He had already expelled the more prominent bishops of
his father's party from their sees, and filled their places by men whom
the
papal legate, Bishop Gebhard of Constance, had no hesitation in
consecrating. But he shewed no disposition to give up any of the rights
exercised by his father, and Paschal did not take advantage of the
opportunity to make conditions or to obtain concessions from him.
Towards
the old king, who made a special appeal to the apostolic mercy,
promising
complete submission to the papal will. Paschal shewed himself
implacable.
There could be no repetition of Canossa, but the Pope renewed the
ambition of Gregory VH in announcing his intention to be present at a
council in Germany. The temporary recovery of power by Henry IV in
1106 prevented the holding of this council in Germany,' and it was
summoned to meet in Italy instead. In the interval Henry died, and still
the
Pope was implacable, refusing to allow the body of the excommunicated
king to be laid to rest in consecrated ground. It was a hollow triumph;
the Papacy was soon to find that it had exchanged an ageing and beaten
foe for a young and resolute one. The death of his father had relieved
Henry V from the immediate necessity of submission to the papal will.
He soon made clear that he was as resolute a champion of royal rights
as his father, and he faced the Pope with Germany united in his
support.
III.
With the death of Henry IV and the reconciliation of Henry V with
the Church, the schism that had lasted virtually for thirty years was at
an end. The desire for peace, rather than any deep conviction of
imperial
guilt, had been responsible perhaps for Henry V's revolt, certainly for
his
victory over his father. By the tacit consent of both sides the claims
and
counter-claims of the years of conflict were ignored; the attempt of
each
power to be master of the other was abandoned, and in the relations
between the Regnum and Sacerdotium the status quo ante was restored.
On the question of lay investiture negotiations had already been started
before the schism began; they were resumed as soon as the schism was
healed, but Papal decrees in the intervening years had increased the
difficulty of solution. Universal as was the desire for peace, this
issue prevented
its consummation for another sixteen years. The contest of Henry V
Lay investiture. Settlements in France and England 99
and the Papacy is solely, and can very rightly be named, an Investiture
Struggle^.
Gregory VII's decrees had been directed against the old idea by which
churches and bishoprics were regarded as possessions of laymen, and
against the practice of investiture by ring and staff which symbolised
the
donation by the king of spiritual functions. He shewed no disposition
to interfere with the feudal obligations which the king demanded from
the
bishops as from all holders of land and offices within his realm. But
his successors were not content merely to repeat his decrees.
At the Council
of Clermont in 1095 Urban II had prohibited the clergy from doing
homage to laymen, and at the Lenten Synod at Rome in 1102 Paschal II
also prohibited the clergy from receiving ecclesiastical property at the
hands of a layman, that is to say, even investiture with temporalities alone.
To Gregory investiture was not important in itself, but only in the lay
control of spiritual functions which it typified, and in the results to which
this led — bad appointments and simony; the prohibition of investiture
was only a means to an end. To Paschal it had become an end in itself.
Rigid in his obedience to the letter of the decrees, he was blind to the
fact that, in order to get rid of the hated word and ceremony, he was
leaving unimpaired the royal control, which was the real evil.
He had already obtained his point in France, and was about to
establish it in England also. In France, owing to the weakness of the
central government, p^pal authority had for some time been more
effective
than elsewhere; Philip I also exposed himself to attack on the moral
side,
and had only recently received absolution (in 1104) after a second
period
of excommunication. Relations were not broken off again, as the Pope
did not take cognisance of Philip*'s later lapses. The king, at any
rate,
was not strong enough to resist the investiture decrees. There was no
actual concordat ; the king simply ceased to invest, and the nobles
followed
his example^ He, and they, retained control of appointments, and in
place of investiture "conceded"" the temporalities of the see, usually
after
consecration and without symbol; the bishops took the oath of fealty,
but usually did not do homage.
Paschal was less successful in England, where again political conditions
were largely responsible for bringing Henry I into the mood for
compromise. Henry and Paschal were equally stubborn, and on Anselm fell
the
brunt of the struggle and the pain of a second exile. At last Henry was
brought to see the wisdom of a reconciliation with Anselm, and the Pope
relented so far as to permit Anselm to consecrate bishops even though
^ The controversial literature shews this very clearly. It is, from now onwards,
confined to the question of lay investiture. Up to this time it was the greater issues
raised by Gregory VII that had been mainly debated.
2 France was peculiar in this, that not only the king but also nobles invested even
to bishoprics. Normandy was in a special position, and what is said with regard to
England should be taken as applying to Normandy also.
CH. 11. 7 — 2
100 The attitude of Henry V
they had received lay investiture or done homage to the king. This paved
the way for the Concordat of August 1107, by which the king gave up
the practice of investing with ring and staff and Anselm consented to
consecrate bishops who had done homage to the king. Thus what the
Pope designed as a temporary concession was turned into a permanent
settlement. The subsequent practice is seen from succeeding elections and
was embodied in the twelfth chapter of the Constitutions of Clarendon.
The king had the controlling voice in the election, the bishop-elect did
homage and took the oath of fealty, and only after that did the consecration
take place. In effect, the king retained the same control as before. The
Pope was satisfied by the abolition of investiture with the ring and staff,
but the king, though hating to surrender an old custom, had his way on
all the essential points.
Paschal II's obsession with the question of investiture is shewn in the
letter he wrote to Archbishop Ruthard of Mayence in November 1105,
a letter which is a fitting prelude to the new struggle. Investiture, he
says,
is the cause of the discord between the regnum and the sacerdotium but
he hopes that the new reign will bring a solution of the difficulty.
Actually it was the new reign that created the difficulty. During the
schism
Papal decrees were naturally disregarded in Germany; royal investiture
continued uninterruptedly, and Henry V from the beginning of his reign
regularly invested with the ring and staff. But when Germany returned
to the Catholic fold, Papal decrees became operative once more, and the
discrepancy between Henry's profession of obedience to Rome and his
practice of investiture was immediately apparent. He was as determined
as his father that the royal prerogative should remain unimpaired, but
he shewed his sense of the direction the controversy was taking and the
weakness of the royal position by insisting that he was only investing
with
the regalia. This made no difference to Paschal, who refused all
compromise on the exercise of investiture; his assertion of his desire
not to
interfere with the royal rights, which had some meaning in Gregory VIFs
mouth, carried no conviction. He must have been sanguine indeed if he
expected in Germany a cessation of investiture as in France; there was
nothing to induce Henry V even to follow the precedent set by his
English
namesake. In Germany there was no parallel to the peculiar position in
England of St Anselm, the primate who put first his profession of
obedience
to the Pope. Archbishops and bishops, as well as lay nobles, were at one
with the king on this question; even the papal legate. Bishop Gebhard
of Constance, who had endured so much in the papal cause, did not
object to consecrate bishops appointed and invested by Henry. And the
German king had legal documents to set against the Papal claims — the
' His reluctance is seen in the jealous complaint he made in 1108 through Anselm,
that the Pope was still allowing the King of Germany to invest.
* This meant the important part, but not the whole, of the temporalities of
the see.
Unsuccessful negotiations between Pope and King 101
privileges of Pope Hadrian I to Charles the Great and of Pope Leo VIII
to Otto the Great — forged documents, it is true, but none the less useful.
It needed a change in the political atmosphere to induce Henry V to
concessions.
The council summoned by Paschal met at Guastalla on 22 October
1106. The Pope was affronted by the scant attention paid by German
bishops to his summons. Instead there appeared an embassy from Henry
claiming that the Pope should respect the royal rights, and at the same
time inviting him again to Germany.
To the first message Paschal replied
by a decree against lay investiture, to the second by an acceptance of
the
invitation, promising to be at Mayence at Christmas. He soon repented
of his promise, whether persuaded of the futility of the journey or
wishing
to avoid the personal encounter, and hastily made his way into France,
where he could be sure of protection and respect. Here he met with a
reception which fell little short of that accorded to Urban ; in
particular
he was welcomed by the two kings, Philip I and his son Louis, who
accompanied the Pope to Chalons in May 1107, where he received the
German ambassadors with Archbishop Bruno of Treves at their head. To
the reasoned statement they presented of the king's demands Paschal
returned a direct refusal, which was pointed by the decree he
promulgated
against investiture at a council held at Troyes on 23 May. At this
council
he took action against the German episcopate, especially for their
disobedience to his summons to Guastalla: the Archbishops of Mayence
and Cologne and their suffragans, with two exceptions, were put under
the ban, and his legate Gebhard received a sharp censure. It was of
little
avail that he invited Henry to be present at a synod in Rome in the
following vear. Henry did not appear, and Paschal was too much occupied
with difficulties in Rome to take any action. But at a synod at
Benevento in 1108 he renewed the investiture decrees, adding the penalty
of
excommunication against the giver as well as the receiver of
investiture.
Clearly he was meditating a definite step against Henry. The king,
however,
had a reason for not wishing at this moment to alienate the Pope — his
desire
for imperial coronation. Accordingly during 1109 and 1110 negotiations
were resumed. An embassy from Henry proposing his visit to Rome was
well received by Paschal, who welcomed the proposal though remaining
firm against the king's demands. At the Lenten Synod of 1110 he repeated
the investiture decree, but, perhaps to prevent a breach in the negotia-
tions, abstained from pronouncing excommunication on the giver of
investiture. He had reiterated to Henry's embassy his intention not to
infringe the royal rights. Had he already conceived his solution of 1111
?
At any rate he took the precaution of obtaining the promise of Norman
support in case of need, a promise which was not fulfilled.^
1 Duke Roger of Apulia died on 21 February 1111, and the Normans were too
weak to come to the Pope's assistance. In fact they feared an imperial attack upon
themselves.
CH. II. 102 The events of 1110
In August 1110 Henry began his march to Rome. From Arezzo, at
the end of December, he sent an embassy to the Pope, making it clear
that he insisted on investing with the temporalities held from the
Empire.
Paschal's answer was not satisfactory, but a second embassy (from
Acquapendente) was more successful. It was now that Paschal produced his
famous solution of the dilemma — the separation of ecclesiastics from
all
secular interests. If Henry would renounce investiture, the Church would
surrender all the regalia held by bishops and abbots, who would be
content for the future with tithes and offerings. Ideally this was an
admirable
solution, and it may have appeared to the unworldly monk to be a
practical one as well. Henry must have known better. He must have
realised that it would be impossible to obtain acquiescence from those
who
were to be deprived of their privileges and possessions. But he saw that
it could be turned to his own advantage. He adroitly managed to lay on
the Pope the onus of obtaining acquiescence; this the Pope readily
undertook, serenely relying on the competency of ecclesiastical censures
to
bring the reluctant to obedience. The compact was made by the pleni-
potentiaries of both sides at the church of Santa Maria in Turri on
4 February 1111, and was confirmed by the king himself at Sutri on
9 February.
On 12 February the king entered St Peter's with the usual preliminary
formalities that attended imperial coronations. The ratification of
the compact was to precede the ceremony proper. Henry rose and read
aloud his renunciation of investiture. The Pope then on behalf of the
Church renounced the regalia, and forbade the holding of them by any
bishops or abbots, present or to come. Immediately burst forth the storm
that might have been expected. Not only the ecclesiastics, who saw the
loss of their power and possessions, but also the lay nobles, who
anticipated
the decline in their authority consequent on the liberation of churches
from their control, joined in the uproar. All was confusion; the
ceremony
of coronation could not proceed. Eventually, after futile negotiations,
the
imperialists laid violent hands on the Pope and cardinals; they were
hurried outside the walls to the king's camp, after a bloody conflict
with
the Romans. A captivity of two months followed, and then the Pope
yielded to the pressure and conceded all that Henry wished. Not only
was royal investiture permitted; it was to be a necessary preliminary to
consecration. They returned together to St Peter's, where on 13 April
the Pope handed Henry his privilege and placed the imperial crown upon
* The accounts published afterwards by both sides are contradictory as to the
actual order of events. The imperial manifesto declares that Henry read his privilege
and that the uproar arose when he called upon the Pope to fulfil his share of the
compact. The Papal manifesto implies that neither privilege was actually read aloud.
The account that Ekkehard gives in his Chronicle (MGH, Script, vi, p. 224 sq.) is that
the uproar occurred after the reading of both privileges. Whatever actually happened,
it is clear that the contents of the two documents were in some way made public.
The Pope forced to retract his concession to Henry 103
his head. Immediately after the ceremony the Pope was released; the
Emperor, who had had to barricade the Leonine city against the populace,
hastily quitted Rome and returned in triumph to Germany.
The Pope had had his moment of greatness. He had tried to bring
the ideal into practice and to recall the Church to its true path; but
the
time was not ripe, the violence of the change was too great, and the
plan
failed. The failure was turned into disaster by the weakness of
character
which caused him to submit to force and make the vital concession of
investiture; for the rest of his life he had to pay the penalty. The
extreme
Church party immediately gave expression to their feelings. Led by the
Cardinal-bishops of Tusculum and Ostia in Rome, and in France and
Burgundy by the Archbishops of Lyons and Vienne*, they clamoured for
the repudiation of the "concession," reminding Paschal of his own
previous
decrees and hinting at withdrawal of obedience if the Pope did not
retract
his oath. In this oath Paschal had sworn, and sixteen cardinals had
sworn
with him, to take no further action in the matter of investiture, and
never to pronounce anathema against the king. Both parts of the oath
he was compelled to forswear, helpless as ever in the presence of
strong-
minded men. At the Lenten Synod of 1112 he retracted his concession
of investiture, as having been extracted from him by force and therefore
null and void. The same year Archbishop Guy of Vienne held a synod
which condemned lay investiture as heresy, anathematised the king, and
threatened to withdraw obedience from the Pope if he did not confirm the
decrees. Paschal wrote on 20 October, meekly ratifying Guy's actions.
But his conscience made his life a burden to him, and led him into
various
inconsistencies. He felt pledged in faith to Henry, and wrote to Germany
that he would not renounce his pact or take action against the Emperor.
The unhappy Pope, however, was not man enough to maintain this
attitude. Harassed by the vehemence of the extremists, whose scorn for
his action was blended with a sort of contemptuous pity, he was forced at
the Lenten Synod of 1116 to retract again publicly the concession of 1111
and to condemn it by anathema. Moreover, Cuno, Cardinal-bishop of
Palestrina, complained that as papal legate at Jemsalem and elsewhere,
he had in the Pope's name excommunicated Henry, and demanded confir-
mation of his action. The Pope decreed this confirmation, and in a letter
to Archbishop Frederick of Cologne the next year, he wrote that hearing
of the archbishop's excommunication of Henry he had abstained from
intercourse with the king. Paschal had ceased to be Head of the Church
in anything but name.
If the events of 1111 brought humiliation to Paschal from all sides,
the Emperor was to get little advantage from his successful violence. The
* Their efforts in France were, however, to a large extent discounted by
the
moderate party with Bishop Ivo of Chartres as its spokesman. He
deprecated the
action of the extremists, especially in their implied rebuke of the
Pope, and emphatically denied that lay investiture could rightly be
stigmatised as heresy.
104 Henry as heir to Countess Matilda
revolt that broke out in Germany in 1112 and lasted with variations of
fortune for nine years was certainly not unconnected with the incidents of
those fateful two months. The Saxons naturally seized the opportunity
to rebel, but it is more surprising to find the leading archbishops and many
bishops of Germany in revolt against the king. Dissatisfaction with the
February compact, indignation at the violence done to the Pope, as
well as the ill-feeling caused by the high-handed policy of Henry in
Germany, were responsible for the outbreak; if Archbishop Adalbert
of Mayence was controlled mainly by motives of personal ambition.
Archbishop Conrad of Salzburg was influenced by ecclesiastical considera-
tions only. Henry's enemies hastened to ally themselves with the extreme
Church party, and Germany was divided into two camps once more. Even
neutrality was dangerous, and Bishop Otto of Bamberg, who had never
lost the favour of Pope or Emperor, found himself placed under anathema
by Adalbert.
An important event in 1115, the death of Countess Matilda of Tuscany,
brought the Emperor again into Italy. He came, early in 1116, to enter
into possession not only of the territory and dignities held from the
Empire but, as heir, of her allodial possessions as well. Matilda, at
some
time in the years 1077-1080, had made over these allodial possessions,
on
both sides of the Alps, to the Roman Church, receiving them back as a
fief from the Papacy, but retaining full right of disposition ^ This
donation she had confirmed in a charter of 17 November 1102. Her free
right
of disposal had been fully exercised, notably on the occasion of Henry's
first expedition to Italy. Both on his arrival, and again at his
departure,
she had shewn a friendliness to him which is most remarkable in view of
his dealings with the Pope. Moreover it seems to be proved that at this
time she actually made him her heir^ without prejudice of course to the
previous donation to the Papacy. The Pope must have been aware of the
bequest, as he made no attempt to interfere with Henry when he came
into Italy to take possession. The bequest to Henry at any rate
prevented
any friction from arising on the question during the Emperor's lifetime,
especially as Henry, like Matilda, retained full disposal and entered
into
no definite vassal-relationship to the Pope. For Henry it was a personal
acquisition of the highest value. By a number of charters to Italian
towns,
which were to be of great importance for the future, he sought to con-
solidate his authority and to regain the support his father had lost.
His
general relations with the Pope do not seem to have caused him any
uneasiness. It was not until the beginning of 1117 that he proceeded to
Rome, where he planned a solemn coronation at Easter and a display of
imperial authority in the city proper, in which he had been unable to
set
foot in 1111.
1 A. Overmann, Grafin Mathilde von Tuscien, pp. 143-4.
2 lb. pp. 43 ff. Overmann shews that this was a personal bequest to her relative
Henry, and was not made to him as Emperor or King of Germany.
Deaths of Paschal II and Gelasius II 106
During the previous year PaschaFs position in Rome had been
endangered by the struggles for the prefecture, in which a boy, son of the
late prefect, was set up in defiance of the Pope"'s efforts on behalf of his
constant supporters the Pierleoni. The arrival of Henry brought a new
terror. Paschal could not face the prospect of having to retract his
retractation; he fled to South Italy. Henry, supported by the prefect,
spent Easter in Rome, and was able to find a complaisant archbishop to
perform the ceremony of coronation in Maurice Bourdin of Braga, who
was immediately excommunicated by the Pope. For the rest of the year
Paschal remained under Norman protection in South Italy, where he re-
newed with certain limitations Urban II's remarkable privilege to Count
Roger of Sicily. Finally in January 1118, as Henry had gone, he could
venture back to Rome, to find peace at last. On 21 January 1118 he died
in the castle of Sant' Angelo.
His successor, John of Gaeta, who took the name of Gelasius II, had
been Chancellor under both Urban II and Paschal II, and had
distinguished
his period of office by the introduction of the ciirsus, which became a
special feature of Papal letters and was later imitated by other
chanceries.
His Papacy only lasted a year, and throughout he had to endure a
continual
conflict with his enemies. The Frangipani made residence in Rome
impossible for him. The Emperor himself appeared in March, and set up
the
excommunicated Archbishop of Braga as Pope Gregory VIII. In April
at Capua Gelasius excommunicated the Emperor and his anti-Pope, and so
took the direct step from which Paschal had shrunk, and a new schism
definitely came into being. At last in September Gelasius set sail for
Pisa, and from there journeyed to France where he knew he could obtain
peace and protection. On 29 January 1119 he died at the monastery of
Cluny.
The cardinals who had accompanied Gelasius to France did not
hesitate long as to their choice of a successor, and on 2 February
Archbishop Guy of Vienne w as elected as Pope Calixtus II ; the election
was
ratified without delay by the cardinals who had remained in Rome. There
was much to justify their unanimity. Calixtus was of high birth, and was
related to the leading rulei-s in Europe — among others to the
sovereigns
of Germany, France, and England; he had the advantage, on which he
frequently insisted, of being able to address them as their equal in
birth.
He had also shewn himself to be a man of strong character and inflexible
determination. As Archbishop of Vienne he had upheld the claims of his
see against the Popes themselves, and apparently had not scrupled to
employ forged documents to gain his ends. He had taken the lead in
Burgundy in opposing the "concession"' of Paschal in 1111, and, as we
have seen, had dictated the Pope's recantation. But the characteristics
that made him acceptable to the cardinals at this crisis might seem to
have
1 On this see R. L. Poole, The Papal Chancery, ch. iv.
106 Pope Calixtus II
militated against the prospects of peace. The result proved the
contrary,
however, and it was probably an advantage that the Pope was a strong
man and would not be intimidated by violence like his predecessor, whose
weakness had encouraged Henry to press his claims to the full. Moreover
the revival of the schism caused such consternation in Germany that it
was perhaps a blessing in disguise. It allowed the opinions of moderate
men, such as Ivo of Chartres and Otto of Bamberg, to make themselves
heard and to force a compromise against the wishes of the extremists on
both sides.
Calixtus soon shewed that he was anxious for peace, by assisting the
promotion of negotiations. These came to a head at Mouzon on 23 October,
when the Emperor abandoned investiture to churches, and a settlement
seemed to have been arranged. But distrust of Henry was very
strpng among the Pope's entourage; they were continually on the alert,
anticipating an attempt to take the Pope prisoner. So suspicious were
they
that they decided there must be a flaw in his pleclge to abandon
investi-
ture; they found it in his not mentioning Church property, investiture
with which was equally repudiated by them. On this point no
accommodation could be reached, and the conference broke up. Calixtus
returned
to Rheims to preside over a synod which had been interrupted by his
departure to Mouzon. The synod pronounced sentence of excommunication
on Henry V and passed a decree against lay investiture; the decree as
originally drafted included a condemnation of investiture with Church
property, but the opposition of the laity to this clause led to its
withdrawal,
and the decree simply condemned investiture with bishoprics and abbeys.
A little less suspicion and the rupture with Henry might have been
avoided.
Investiture was not the only important issue at the Synod of Rheims. During its session the King of France, Louis VI, made a dramatic appeal to the Pope against Henry I of England. On 20 November Calixtus met Henry himself at Gisors, and found him ready enough to make peace with Louis but unyielding on the ecclesiastical questions which he raised himself. They were especially in conflict on the relations between the Archbishops of Canterbury and York. Calixtus had reversed the decision of his predecessors and denied the right of Canterbury to the obedience of York, which Lanfranc had successfully established. Perhaps his own experience led him to suspect the forgeries by which Lanfranc had built up his case, or he may have been anxious to curb the power of Canterbury which had rendered unsuccessful a mission on which he had himself been employed as Papal legate to England. He insisted on the non-subordination of York to Canterbury ; in return, he later granted to the Archbishop of Canterbury the dignity of permanent Papal legate in England. This may have given satisfaction to the king; it also gave a foothold for Papal authority in a country which Papal legates had not been allowed to enter without royal permission.
1 See infra, Chap, xvni, pp. 603-4.
The Concordat of Worms 107
For more than a year Calixtus remained in France. When he made
his wav into Italy and arrived at Rome in June 1120, he met with an
enthusiastic reception ; though he spent many months in South Italy,
his residence in Rome was comparatively untroubled. The failure of the
negotiations at Mouzon delayed peace for three more years, but the
universal desire for it was too strong to be gainsaid. Two events in 1121
prepared the way. Firstly, the capture of the anti-Pope in April by
Calixtus removed a serious obstacle; the wretched Gregory Mil had
received, as he complained, no support from the Emperor who had exalted
him. Secondly, at Michaelmas in the Diet of Wiirzburg the German
nobles restored peace between Henry and his opponents in Germany,
and promised by their mediation to effect peace with the Church also.
This removed the chief difficulties.
Suspicion of the king had ruined
negotiations at Mouzon; his pledges were now to be guaranteed by the
princes of the Empire. Moreover with Germany united for peace, the
Papacy could have little to gain by holding out against it; Calixtus
shewed his sense of the changed situation bv the conciliatory, though
firm, letter which he wrote to Henry on 19 February 1122 and sent by
the hand of their common kinsman. Bishop Azzo of Acqui. Henry had
as little to gain by obstinacy, and shewed himself prepared to carry out
the decisions of the Diet of Wiirzburg and to promote the re-opening of
negotiations. The preliminaries took time. The papal plenipotentiaries
fixed on Mayence as the meeting-place for the council, but the Emperor
won an important success in obtaining the change of venue from this city,
where he had in the archbishop an implacable enemy, to the more loyal
Worms; here on 23 September was at last signed the Concordat which
brought Empire and Papacy into communion once more.
The Concordat of Worms^ was a treaty of peace between the two
powers, each of whom signed a diploma granting concessions to the other.
The Emperor, besides a general guarantee of the security of Church
property and the freedom of elections, surrendered for ever investiture
with the ring and staff. The Pope in his concessions made an important
distinction between bishoprics and abbeys in Germany and those in Italy
and Burgundy. In the former he granted that elections should take place
in the king's presence and allowed a certain authority to the king in
disputed elections ; the bishop or abbot elect was to receive the
regalia from
the king by the sceptre, and in return was to do homage and take the
oath of fealty, before consecration. In Italy and Burgundy consecration
was to follow a free election, and within six months the king might
bestow
the regalia by the sceptre and receive homage in return. This
distinction
marked a recognition of existing facts. The Emperor had exercised little
^ The original of the imperial diploma is in the Vatican archives. A facsimile of
it is given in MIOGF, Vol. vi.
2 In both cases the words used are: "Sceptrum a te recipiat et quae ex his iure
tibi debet faciat."
108 Effect of the Concordat
control over elections in Burgundy, and had been gradually losing
authority in Italy. Two factors had reduced the importance of the Italian
bishoprics: the growing power of the communes, often acquiesced in by
the bishops, had brought about a corresponding decline in episcopal
authority, and the bishops had in general acceded to the papal reform
decrees, so that they were far less amenable to imperial control. As far
as Germany was concerned, it remained of the highest importance to the
king to retain control over the elections, as the temporal authority of the
bishops continued unimpaired. And here, though the abolition of the
obnoxious use of spiritual symbols satisfied the Papal scruples, the royal
control of elections remained effective. But it cannot be denied that the
Concordat was a real gain to the Papacy. The Emperor's privilege was
a surrender of an existing practice; the Pope"'s was only a statement of
how much of the existing procedure he was willing to countenanced
On 11 November a diet at Bamberg confirmed the Concordat, which
forthwith became part of the constitutional law of the Empire. In
December the Pope wrote a letter of congratulation to Henry and sent
him his blessing, and at the Lenten Synod of 1123^ proceeded to ratify
the Concordat on the side of the Church as well. The imperial diploma
was welcomed with enthusiasm by the synod ; against the Papal
concessions
there was some murmuring, but for the sake of peace they were tolerated
for the time. It was recognised that they were not irrevocable, and
their wording rendered possible the claim that, while Henry's privilege
was binding on his successors, the Pope's had been granted to Henry
alone for his lifetime. There were also wide discrepancies of opinion as
to the exact implication of the praesentia regis at elections and the
influence he could exercise at disputed elections. By Henry V, and later
by Frederick Barbarossa, these were interpreted in the sense most
favourable to the king. Between Henry and Calixtus, however, no friction
arose,
despite the efforts of Archbishop Adalbert to provoke the Pope to action
against the Emperor. Calixtus died in December 1124, Henry in the
following summer, without any violation of the peace. The subordination
of Lothar to ecclesiastical interests allowed the Papacy to improve its
position, which was still further enhanced during the weak reign of
Conrad.
Frederick I restored royal authority in this direction as in others, and the
version of the Concordat given by Otto of Freising represents his point
of view ; the difference between Italian and German bishoprics is ignored,
and the wording of the Concordat is slightly altered to admit of in-
terpretation in the imperial sense. It is clear that the Concordat
'
See A. Hofmeister, Das Wormner Konkordat (Festschrift Dietrich Sch'dfer zum 70 Geburtstug). Hofmeister, following Schafer against Bernheiin and others^ insists also that, though Henry's privilege was to the Papacy in perpetuity, the Pope's was only to Henry for his lifetime. The Church party certainly adopted this view, but that it was recognised by the imperialists seems to be disproved by subsequent history.
2 The First Lateran Council.
The enhanced position of the Papacy 109
contained within itself difficulties that prevented it from becoming a
permanent settlement; its great work was to put on a legal footing the
relations of the Emperor with the bishops and abbots of Germany. What
might have resulted in connexion with the Papacy we cannot tell. The
conflict between Frederick I and the Papacy was again a conflict for
masterv, in which lesser subjects of difference were obliterated. Finally
Frederick II made a grand renunciation of imperial rights at elections
on 12 July 1213, before the last great conflict began.
The first great contest between Empire and Papacy had virtually
come to an end with the death of Henry IV. Its results were indecisive.
The Concordat of Worms had provided a settlement of a minor issue,
but the great question, that of supremacy, remained unsettled. It was
tacitly ignored by both sides until it was raised again by the challenging
words of Hadrian IV. But the change that had taken place in the relations
between the two powers was in itself a great victory for the Papal idea.
The Papacy, which Henry III had controlled as master from 1046 to 1056,
had claimed authority over his son, and had at any rate treated as an
equal with his grandson. In the ecclesiastical sphere the Pope had obtained
a position which he was never to lose. That he was the spiritual head of
the Church would hardly have been questioned before, but his authority
had been rather that of a suzerain, who was expected to leave the local
archbishops and bishops in independent control of their own districts.
In imitation of the policy of the temporal rulers, the Popes had striven,
with a large measvu-e of success, to convert this suzerainty into a true
sovereignty. This was most fully recognised in France, though it was very
widely accepted also in Germany and North Italy. In England, Papal
authority had made least headway, but even here we find in Anselm an
archbishop of Canterbury placing his profession of obedience to the Pope
above his duty to his temporal sovereign. The spiritual sovereigntv of
the Papacy was bound to mean a limitation of the authority of the
temporal rulers.
Papal sovereignty found expression in the legislative, executive, and
Judicial supremacy of the Pope. At general synods, held usually at Rome
and during Lent, he promulgated decrees binding on the whole Church;
these decrees were repeated and made effective by local synods also, on
the holding of which the Popes insisted. The government was centralised
in the hands of the Pope, firstly, by means of legates, permanent or
temporary, who acted in his name with full powers: secondlv, bv the
frequent summons to Rome of bishops and especially of archbishops, who,
moreover, were rarely allowed to receive the pallium except from the
hand of the Pope himself. A more elaborate organisation was contemplated
in the creation of primacies, begun in France by Gregory VII and extended
by his successors; while certain archbishops were thus given authority
over others, they were themselves made more directly responsible to Rome.
110 Ecclesiastical and political considerations
And as Papal authority became more real, the authority of archbishops
and bishops tended to decrease. The encouragement of direct appeals to
Rome was a cause of this, as was the papal protection given to monasteries,
especially by Urban II, with exemption in several cases from episcopal
control. Calixtus II, as a former archbishop, was less in sympathy with
this policy and guarded episcopal rights over monasteries with some care.
But the close connexion of the Papacy with so many houses in all parts
tended to exalt its position and to lower the authority of the local bishop ;
it had a further importance in the financial advantage it brought to the
Papacy.
Papal elections were now quite free. The rights that had been preserved
to Henry IV in the Election Decree of Nicholas II had lapsed
during the schism. Imperial attempts to counteract this by the appoint-
ment of subservient anti-Popes had proved a complete failure. In
episcopal
elections, too, progress had been made towards greater freedom. There
was a tendency towards the later system of election by the chapter, but
at
present clergy outside the chapter and influential laymen had a
considerable and a lawful share. In Germany and England the royal will
was
still the decisive factor. It may be noticed here that the Popes did not
attempt to introduce their own control over elections in place of the
lay
control which they deprecated. They did, however, frequently decide in
cases of dispute, or order a new election when they considered the
previous
one to be uncanonical in form or invalid owing to the character of the
person elected; occasionally too, as Gregory VII in the case of Hugh and
the archbishopric of Lyons, they suggested to the electors the suitable
candidate. But the Papal efforts were directed primarily to preserving
the purity of canonical election.
The Reform Movement had led to a devastating struggle, but in
many respects its results were for good. There was undoubtedly a greater
spirituality noticeable among the higher clergy, in Germany as well as in
France, at the end of the period. The leading figure among the moderates,
Bishop Otto of Bamberg, was to become famous as the apostle of Pome-
rania, and Archbishop Conrad of Salzburg was to be prominent not only in
politics but also for his zeal in removing the clergy from secular pursuits.
In the age that followed, St Bernard and St Norbert were able by their
personality and spiritual example to exercise a dominance over the rulers
of France and Germany denied to the Popes themselves.
There was indeed another side of Papal activity which tended to lessen
their purely spiritual influence. The temporal power was to some extent
a necessity, for spiritual weapons were of only limited avail. Gregory
VII
had apparently conceived the idea of a Europe owning Papal suzerainty,
but his immediate successors limited themselves to the Papal States,
extended by the whole of South Italy, where the Normans recognised Papal
overlordship. The alliance with the Normans, so often useful, almost
necessary, was dangerous and demoralising. It had led to the fatal
results
Papal advance due to Gregory VII 111
of Gregory's last years and was for some time to give the Normans a
considerable influence over papal policy, while the claim of overlordship
of the South was to lead to the terrible struggle with the later Hohen-
staufen and its aftermath in the contest of Angenns and Aragonese. In
Rome itself Papal authority, which had been unquestioned during
Gregory's archidiaconate and Papacy up to 1083, received a severe check
from Norman brutality ; it was long before it could be recovered in full
again.
The great advance of Papal authority spiritual and temporal, its rise as
a power co-equal with the Empire, was not initiated indeed by Gregory
VII,
but it was made possible by him and he was the creator of the new
Papacy.
He had in imagination travelled much farther than his immediate
successors were willing to follow. But he made claims and set in motion
theories which were debated and championed by writers of greater
learning
than his own, and though they lay dormant for a time they were not
forgotten. St Bernard shewed what spiritual authority could achieve.
Gregory VII had contemplated the Papacy exercising this authority,
and his claims were to be brought into the light again, foolishly and
impetuously at first by Hadrian IV, but with more insight and
determination by Innocent III, with whom they were to enter into the
region
of the practical and in some measure actually to be carried into effect.
Gregory VII owed much to Nicholas I and the author of the Forged
Decretals; Innocent III owed still more to Gregory VII.
-112-